| This dissertation argues that the existing disjunction between ethical and legal justifications for humanitarian military intervention undermines the international rule of law with respect to use of force and negatively impacts the efficacy and consistency of humanitarian military policy. The cause of the this disjunction is located in the unfortunate influence of analytic positivism as the dominant jurisprudential school of thought in the 19 th and 20th centuries, and the implicit and explicit incorporation of positivist assumptions about sovereign consent as the essence of law in the UN Charter. As a solution to this problem, it is recommended that positivism be dislodged from its position of prominence as an analytic tool for explaining international law with respect to humanitarian military intervention and replaced with a conceptualization of legality as inherently tied to ethical and humanitarian considerations. Second, it is suggested that a new international rule of law on humanitarian military intervention be codified, so that the basis of Security Council authorization is clarified. More specifically, it is recommended that the definition of conditional sovereignty be codified, and that humanitarian atrocities with no trans-national or trans-boundary implications be deemed sufficient to trigger Security Council consideration under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In addition, an explicit ethical/pragmatic basis for Security Council authorization of humanitarian use of force should be codified. |
