| This dissertations contains three essays on dynamic games. In the first essay, I build a model to study the effects of renegotiation on dynamic agency with adverse selection. This essay analyses the extent that renegotiation impairs a monopolist to use price-discrimination devices in a dynamic setting. The model provides predictions about efficiency and surplus distribution between the consumer and the monopolist. In the second essay, I study the effect of correlated private information in a dynamic principal-agent model with subjective evaluations. In special, I compare the efficiency of bonus-payments equilibria with efficiency-wage equilibria and I provide conditions under which bonus-payments equilibria lead to a higher surplus than efficiency-wage equilibria. In the third essay (joint with Dino Gerardi), I study the optimal provision of incentives in a sequential testing context. This essay investigates the best way to provide intertemporal incentives for an expert to acquire information and report it truthfully. |
