On freedom and rationality

This treatise sets out and defends a compatibilist theory of freedom, within the broad tradition of compatibilist thought. The underlying viewpoint is that of physicalism; however, no particular sort of physicalism is endorsed. Similarly, it recommends no particular view of determinism; but assumes that on the macroscopic (supra-molecular) level at least, occurrences of indeterminacy are rare. This turns out to be of importance to the theory presented.; No consideration is given to the question of moral responsibility, though for many philosophers that has been the chief source of the problem's interest. The view adopted here is that it is more feasible to deal with the question of what is true of freedom 'in the world' unencumbered by considerations of responsibility, which can be addressed afterward.; For many libertarians, 'free will' has to fit a concept of moral responsibility; this has contributed to an extreme view of freedom of choice, which has been called "radical freedom." According to this view, the 'causal chains' implied by determinism must be eluded for true free will to hold; which for some has meant, in particular, that occurrences of indeterminism must be invoked. Since libertarianism is the main rival to compatibilism (as 'free will' is also to compatibilist freedom), this view is criticized. It is argued that one would not be more free were such occurrences of indeterminism to appear in one's causal history; indeed, one would likely be less free.; The treatise develops a theory of freedom; it does this by starting with the everyday concept of freedom, and considering how far that might be extended. The central unifying feature of the theory is the concept of control, taken in a naturalistic way. Specification of the relation between freedom and control of the right sort is a key development in the theory.; Rationality appears as the highest development of such control, at least in the biological realm. It is also linked to our freedom's fullest extent; and accordingly provides the background for an interpretation of the 'could have done otherwise' criterion, taken by many as the supreme criterion of freedom.