| In this dissertation, I write three empirical essays in microeconomics of corruption. In each of these essays, I investigate different dimensions of corruption using microeconomic data. In the first essay, I analyze the interaction between inspections by electricity inspectors and bribe payments by inspected firms in Bangladesh. I take an instrumental variable approach to correct for the endogeneity problem. I find that increased inspection reduces probability of bribe, but increases bribe payment. In the second essay, I consider the unofficial fees for consultation charged by public doctors in Bangladesh which is otherwise, free. I find that doctors practice a price discrimination strategy for which patients coming from far pay more consultation fees and doctors faced with more competition charge lower fees. In the third essay, I analyze the impact of the new, stricter electricity theft rules on electricity system loss in India. System loss is the unbilled portion of the supplied electricity in a delivery system and electricity that are stolen is captured in it. The new theft rule should not affect the technical component of system loss but can be expected to reduce electricity theft which will be reflected on reduced system loss. I find that the introduction of the new theft rule indeed reduces the system loss and the result is statistically significant. |
