| Soon after his election, the President-elect and his closest advisors must consider, from among all those who are “eligible” by some standards, which potential appointees warrant serious consideration. Then, drawing upon “short lists” of possible candidates for each Cabinet position, the President-elect chooses the actual nominee. Incoming Presidents generally choose members of the Inner Cabinet (Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, and Attorney General) quickly, before making other Cabinet choices.; As these Cabinet members will have a significant impact upon policy, the President-elect's choices of who they are likely to be constitute, in essence, his first act of governance. Although the public and the press ask many questions and offer many speculations and predictions regarding these selections, coherent theoretical analyses are lacking. Existing works consist primarily of descriptive accounts that focus either on a particular president or a particular nominee. As a consequence, prior treatments leave the impression of a selection process that is highly idiosyncratic—governed by particular personalities and circumstances that do not carry over from one incoming President to the next.; In this study, rather than regard such decisions as idiosyncratic, I explain the Inner Cabinet choices of Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, systematically. I explain the formulation of a pool of qualified candidates and the selection of a nominee to the Inner Cabinet and to examine conditions in the political environment such as divided government. I use the principal-agent framework to argue that Presidents-elect are purposeful and motivated principals who want to appoint to the Inner Cabinet people who will be their loyal agents and promote their policies.; I focus on the four original Inner Cabinet appointments of each President and identify, by way of documents and interviews, who was on the short list, what the President-elect's decision-making process was, and the primary criteria for each selection. I argue that when Presidents-elect consider potential appointees, they will dominate the decision-making process and rely primarily on policy compatibility to reduce any uncertainty about potential nominees' post-confirmation behavior. I conclude that policy compatibility, while perhaps a necessary condition for faithful agency is not sufficient. |
