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Causes in mind: Causal exclusion's collapse and the causal powers of content

Posted on:2006-02-21Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:Columbia UniversityCandidate:Butler, Randall MFull Text:PDF
GTID:1455390008456272Subject:Philosophy
Abstract/Summary:
In this dissertation, I deal with two problems of mental causation: (1) causal exclusion, and (2) the causal efficacy of mental content. I deal with (1) in Chapters 1 and 2. For physicalists, causal exclusion arises as follows. The neural state underlying, subvening, or realizing a thought causally suffices for any action that thought might seem to cause. Thus the neural state is the real cause; the thought is epiphenomenal. Causal exclusion generalizes to all higher level properties, such as special science properties, rendering them epiphenomenal as well. Thus, causation occurs only at the base level of physics.;I argue that causal exclusion fails since it is based on a misconception of the relation between macro and micro level causal powers, causal transactions, and causal processes. Although a given micro level causal process may causally suffice for a given macro level causal process, it is not causally necessary for that macro process. Drawing on work of Yablo and others, I develop a conception of the relation between the macro and micro (the realization relation) such that macro level causes are not preempted by their micro realizers. Thus, mental causation, as well as all higher level causation, is not rendered epiphenomenal by causal exclusion.;I deal with the causal efficacy of content in Chapters 3 and 4. I conceive this problem as follows: If content is essentially externally determined, how can it enter into causal transactions? Causation is local: "no action at a distance." I sketch a conception of mentality in Chapter 3. Arguing against narrow content theories, I contend that appeal to mental states as having a biological function will ensure content's causal powers. Drawing on and criticizing Dretske's work, I execute this strategy in Chapter 4. I develop a conception of a belief-fixing system that has the proper function of producing beliefs that guide fitness-enhancing behavior. All beliefs this system produces have causal access to the motor control system. Their causal efficacy, in virtue of their content, is thereby ensured.
Keywords/Search Tags:Causal, Content, Causation, Mental
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