CONATUS and TRIEB: The concept of impulse connecting Spinoza and Freud

Much has been said between Spinoza and Freud. Usually the relation between the two is either Spinoza is the precursor of Freud or they are incompatible for the most part. The purpose of this dissertation is to show that there is an alternative to think the relation between Freud and Spinoza: a reciprocal approach where both authors can provide valuable insights and concepts to the understanding of human behavior and its place in nature. This reciprocity becomes feasible not through the juxtaposition of terms, but through the analysis of the concept of impulse, a concept both share. While Spinoza starts at God or nature and ends in psychology, Freud starts with mental illnesses and stops at meta-psychological concepts. To achieve this goal, the concept of impulse (conatus in Spinoza, trieb in Freud) is examined starting from Spinoza's book III of "Ethics" and going back to his concept of God in book I and returning to book III for a "psychological" analysis. The notion of impulse in Freud is scrutinized in a historical order of presentation to show the changes the concept suffered along Freud's life. It is important to emphasize that the concept of impulse in Freud is dissected only in its economic perspective. At the end, although it can be noticed along the reading of the chapters, one will observe that the concept of impulse, which is impulse to persevere in existence, changes from an ontological to a psychological concept, the latter being the expression of the former. In this framework, the concept of impulse has different moments. Moreover, the mobility of the concept of impulse through Spinoza to Freud and vice-versa may aid further understanding their theoretical positions and provide a stimulating background to future development to their theories.