Aristotle on stasis: A moral psychology of political skepticism

In Politics 5, Aristotle considers the nature and causes of stasis. Stasis is a pathological condition of a city that disposes its citizens to form factional associations that lead to disorder, conflict and violence. Aristotle claims that conflicting views of justice drive oligarchic and democratic factions into conflict over the distribution of wealth and honor. The conflicting views of justice that are the alleged cause of faction are divided into three proximate causes arising from the beliefs and desires of these agents.; This dissertation argues that the ultimate cause of these beliefs and desires is the character deficiencies of the agents possessing them, especially envy ( , anoh&d12;t ov ) and vanity ( , a&d12;4qon ov ). The agent's character shapes his beliefs and desires and, in turn, causes factional strife during provocative circumstances. This account is central to Aristotle's skepticism about remedying stasis in most cities. They face a vicious circle where stasis prevention is impossible because the right character of citizens could be achieved only if their city were already structured to promote excellence more than wealth, honor or license. The most that can be expected is the stabilization, not the correction, of cities infected with stasis.; But the fact that stasis is as inevitable as the bad character that causes it does not entail a thoroughgoing skepticism. Rather, a more moderate skepticism provides plausible grounds for limiting stasis without eliminating its causes. Even though institutional remedies, such as the selective redistribution of honor and wealth, cannot eliminate the character sources of factional conflict, they can limit the circumstances in which it occurs. But they can do so only if they take into account what character causes are triggered under specific circumstances. An analysis of these remedies reveals an implicit ranking of the vices that cause faction more and less: envy ( , anoh&d12;t ov ), vanity ( , a&d12;4qon ov ), ambition ( 4ilotimi &d12;a ), flattery ( ko&d12;lax ), recklessness ( qra&d12;s ov ), intemperance ( , aso4ro&d12; sunh ) and stinginess ( , an3l3uq3 ri&d12;a ). The final chapter explains their function in three representative stasis scenarios, considering their propensity to hasten, curb or be indifferent to the circumstances and events of stasis. This ranking provides a character-oriented basis for limiting the vices that most fuel stasis.; The argument of this dissertation, then, connects the fundamental claims of Aristotle's ethics of character formation and rational choice with his politics of realism and theory of factional strife.