Knowledge and the first-person perspective

I show how revising our view of the first-person perspective reorients the debate about the significance of reflection in the theory of knowledge. I argue that neither internalists nor externalists about knowledge give proper consideration to the first-person view. Many internalists focus on the ability to access some kind of support for one's belief, but overlook the fact that mere third-personal access does not satisfy central internalist intuitions. On the other hand, externalists who think that the theory of knowledge can be kept distinct from first-person concerns are also mistaken, for they must address a tension between externalism and a central obligation of doxastic agents: the obligation to be involved in deliberately shaping one's beliefs in light of one's judgments about what the reasons support. I then propose a revision in the prevailing conception of the first-person perspective, arguing that we need to reject the notion that the first-person perspective is comprised of thoughts that are exclusively self-regarding. The alternative to the self-regarding view allows that both first-order and second-order thoughts arise from within a single first-person perspective.