Primitive agency

In this dissertation I argue for the existence of a generic form of agency common to humans and non-human animals alike. To this end I argue that action is a natural kind, the central properties of which can be specified without reference to the participation of an intention to act. After criticizing several analyses of primitive action and guided movement, I advocate an approach towards understanding both agents and their actions as self-organized systems. This viewpoint allows for the application of new concepts that can make sense of agent-guidance without succumbing to the problems facing other approaches. However, this approach presents the unique challenge of non-arbitrarily distinguishing the whole organism both from its constituent parts and from its environment, all of which are complex systems. I argue that autonomous self-producing systems distinguish themselves from their environment in non-arbitrary ways. Such systems are essentially concerned with preserving their autonomy. I argue that metabolism is the source of normativity in living systems, and that the agent can be identified by the particular norms governing the expenditure of energy through sensorimotor activity in an uncertain environment. These "norms of investment" serve as the means both for identifying the agent and for making sense of primitive agency.