| During the Cold War, why did organized labor's position on international trade run contrary to the predictions of economic theory? More specifically, why did the American Federation of Labor choose to embrace free trade when, according to the Stopler-Samuelson Theorem, this ran contrary to labor's economic well-being? Using information gathered from archival sources, interviews and historical descriptions, I examined how labor's trade policies were derived, investigating their potential---or perceived---benefits for labor, and evaluate how successful labor was in achieving its goals. Ultimately, the fact that their support for free trade, as well as other aspects of American foreign policy during the postwar era, was rewarded with a "seat at the table" for the making of official policy proved a decisive consideration for the leadership of the labor movement.; Central to this case study is a look at labor's acceptance of free trade during the 1930s, its role in the implementation of post-war reconstruction and beyond, and its reaction to a change in labor's overall economic fortunes particularly during the 1960s and 1970s. I specifically examine labor's evaluation of US trade polices from GATT, the Marshall Plan, to the Kennedy Round and the Trade Reform Act of 1973. As these policies became more harmful to the interests of organized labor, labor moved away from its support of free trade to a policy of fair trade in which labor would be protected or compensated from the market disruptions caused by international competition.; This study additionally shows the things labor did---both domestically and internationally---to cast itself as a formidable player in the formation of the United States' international trade policies. It examines labor's decisions from both a factor-based theoretical view point and a sector-based point of view in an attempt to decide which theory best explains labor's behavior. |