| This research focuses on managing decentralized assembly supply chains under uncertainty, which is motivated by the outsourcing practice in various industries. In a decentralized assembly supply chain, multiple suppliers produce and deliver a set of complementary products to the market or to a downstream, independent assembler who assembles them into a final product and sells it to the market. We formulate and analyze the inherent gaming problems to gain insights into the strategic interactions of firms involved in such supply chains and their implications to channel decisions and performance.; Specifically, this research consists of three essays each addressing a supply chain setting with specific managerial concerns. The first essay (presented in Chapter 1) considers the coordination of production decisions of suppliers with different component production lead-times and time-dependent market prices for the final product of the assembler. The second essay (presented in Chapter 2) studies a setting where the products of different suppliers are only partially complementary. The third essay (presented in Chapter 3) relaxes a basic model assumption of the second essay, which leads to dissimilar model solutions.; The first essay is a joint work with Professor Yunzeng Wang and Professor Rick So from University of California at Irvine, and the last two are joint works with Professor Yunzeng Wang. |
