Analyzing interaction of electricity markets and environmental policies using equilibrium models

Around the world, the electric sector is evolving from a system of regulated vertically-integrated monopolies to a complex system of competing generation companies, unregulated traders, and regulated transmission and distribution. One emerging challenge faced by environmental policymakers and electricity industry is the interaction between electricity markets and environmental policies. The objective of this dissertation is to examine these interactions using large-scale computational models of electricity markets based on noncooperative game theory. In particular, this dissertation is comprised of four essays.; The first essay studies the interaction of the United States Environmental Protection Agency NOx Budget Program and the mid-Atlantic electricity market. This research quantifies emissions, economic inefficiencies, price distortions, and overall social welfare under various market assumptions using engineering-economic models. The models calculate equilibria for imperfectly competitive markets---Cournot oligopoly---considering the actual landscape of power plants and transmission lines, and including the possibility of market power in the NOx allowances market. The second essay extends the results from first essay and models imperfectly competitive markets using a Stackelberg or leader-follower formulation. A leader in the power and NO x markets is assumed to have perfect foresight of its rivals' responses. The rivals' best response functions are explicitly embedded in the leader's constraints. The solutions quantify the extent to which a leader in the markets can extract economic rents on the expense of its followers. The third essay investigates the effect of implementing the European Union (EU) CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) on wholesale power prices in the Western European electricity market. This research uses theoretical and computational modeling approaches to quantify the degree to which CO2 costs were passed on to power prices, and quantifies the windfall profits earned by generators under the current EU allowances allocation method. The results show that the generators in EU could earn substantial windfall profits from two sources: free emissions allowances and increased gross margin among inframarginal generating units. The fourth essay examines effect of climate change on future pollution emissions from regional electricity markets, accounting for how climate influences demand profiles and generation efficiencies. This research illustrates that even when seasonal/annual pollution emissions are limited by regulatory caps, significant increases in emissions during high-demand hours could potentially lead to an increase in the occurrences of acute ozone episodes, which worsen public health during summer months.; The major contributions of this dissertation are two fold. First, the methodological and computational framework developed in the research provides a basis for understanding complex interactions among several oligopolistic markets and climate policies. Second, the outcomes of the research reinforce the need for careful monitoring of market interactions and a thorough examination of the design of allowances and power markets.