Essays on Crowdfunding: Information Asymmetry, Signaling and Feedbac

New ventures often seek external financing to bring their product or service to market. In recent years, crowdfunding has emerged as a new form of financing where entrepreneurs can fund their initiatives by drawing on relatively small contributions from a large number of individuals (the "crowd") using the internet. While crowdfunding has gained momentum as an alternative source of financing, it presents unique challenges for both startups and individuals in the crowd due to the information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and the crowd. This dissertation explores how the start-up and the crowd of backers resolve information asymmetry to achieve crowdfunding success. First, I explore how signals of startup actions and characteristics interact with third-party endorsements from the crowd to mitigate information asymmetry concerns about project quality and founder credibility for potential backers. Second, I investigate the role of feedback in the decision making of new venture founders and potential customers.