Information and institutional legitimacy: The UN Security Council, regional organizations, and state behavior

How do international institutions matter in security affairs? Although scholars have devoted considerable attention the role of institutions, very little work focuses on how they may alter foreign policy behavior in the "high-politics" realm of security. One extant answer is that institutions can provide legitimacy to foreign policy. This dissertation examines this claim through the lens of rationalist theories of information transmission. A formal model of strategic information transmission between an international institution, a sovereign government, and a domestic audience, is analyzed. The results demonstrate that legitimacy often derives from biased institutions. The theory's predictions are tested on U.S. public reaction to UN Security Council decisions regarding U.S. uses of force, the decision of states to consult international organizations during all crises 1946-2003, and the decision of states to come to the aid of allies conditional on international institution support. Taken together, the findings suggest that the UN Security Council is most influential when it is perceived as biased, relative to the state seeking its sanction. The theory and empirics highlight and important and novel way institutions matter through the indirect channel of public opinion.