| British disarmament policy has become the subject of renewed criticism for failing to bridge the Franco-German divide during the life of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. Indeed, recent commentators have suggested that Britain consciously avoided the role of honest broker at Geneva and, instead, adopted, a policy of subterfuge derived both from a distinct disinterest in the cause of disarmament and a persistent desire to exploit fully the armament process for British gain. This interpretation of British disarmament policy, however, does not serve to define the role of the British Foreign Office. Between 1932 and 1934, the Foreign Office formulated disarmament policy on the basis of two fundamental themes. First, shunning the responsibility of honest broker, the department demonstrated a keen resolve for fashioning disarmament policy along the contours of Anglo-French relations. Simply put, Germany's claims to equality would be addressed on the basis of unity between the two erstwhile allied powers. Second, the Foreign Office was determined, in any disarmament accord, to ensure the stability of the European balance of power. At its core, this meant safeguarding against Germany's military recrudescence by depriving Berlin of the tools for offensive operations. The implementation of this blended policy, however, faced several hurdles, both internal and external, which effectively muted its proposed intentions. |
