| This dissertation explains how the leaders of rising powers make foreign policy, focusing on Maoist China and Nehruvian India. For several reasons, rising states might be expected to act conservatively in foreign affairs. Rather than fighting more powerful rivals in the present, power transition theory suggests they will defer such conflicts until they have grown stronger. Rather than making costly diplomatic commitments, rising states might seem more likely to shun constraints on their future power. Historically, however, rising powers have sometimes acted with remarkable boldness. When will rising states bide their time and when will they not?; This study argues that these decisions are powerfully shaped by the "national efficacy beliefs" of individual leaders. Building on psychological research and international relations theory, it identifies two kinds of national efficacy in particular: martial efficacy, or the proficiency of a state at military combat, and moral efficacy, or the ability to shape international norms through diplomacy. When sufficiently robust, these beliefs inspire the leaders of rising states to assert themselves before their rise is complete. Strong martial efficacy beliefs prompt leaders to play up the opportunities, and play down the dangers, of ambitious military moves in the present. Strong moral efficacy beliefs do the same in diplomacy. Different national efficacy beliefs thus lead to different strategic choices.; This framework helps explain the very different courses charted by China under Mao and India under Nehru. As hypothesized, Mao proved more willing to challenge stronger states militarily, as evidenced by his interventions in Korea and Vietnam. In contrast, Nehru proved more willing to make costly moves in diplomacy, as shown by his approach to Kashmir and nuclear disarmament.; This project contributes to the study of international relations in several ways. Focusing on efficacy beliefs, it provides new insight into how political elites make foreign policy. It also brings to light new historical evidence acquired through archival research and interviews in Beijing, Nanjing, New Delhi, Mumbai, Boston, and London. Lastly, it offers a comprehensive theory of how rising powers make strategic choices, with important implications for the study of China and India today. |
