The state, authority, and legitimacy

The state exercises political power over its subjects. Man, on the other hand, is born free. The question is whether the state is morally justified in coercively infringing upon the autonomy of its subjects.; The classic solution has been to try to justify the authority of the state by arguing that state subjects have a duty to obey the state's authoritative commands. Recently, a second solution has gained ground. It does not defend a moral theory of state authority, but of state legitimacy. If successful, this solution would demonstrate that the state is morally justified in exercising coercive power over its subjects, even though they owe the state no obligations of obedience.; The dissertation provides a critical overview of the dominant strategies for justifying authority and legitimacy. It draws special attention to the role content-independent justifications for state action play in both kinds of theories. It argues that the quest for content-independence is a key reason that both kinds of theories fail to realize their objectives. This fact has hitherto been largely neglected in the academic discourse. The dissertation proposes that in most cases, exercising coercive political power requires content-dependent justification. Special attention is paid to George Klosko's non-voluntary theory of fairness, and his transition from a content-independent to a content-dependent theory of political obligation.; Instead of endorsing the anarchist conclusion that there are no morally legitimate states, the dissertation ends by proposing a content-dependent theory of state legitimacy. To be morally legitimate, a state must be (i) reasonably just, and (ii) reasonably effective at providing necessary presumptive benefits.