Reasons contextualism

My dissertation is an attempt to elucidate the idea of a 'reason' in the normative, practical sense. I argue that Scanlon's buck-passing account of value can be improved in certain ways and offer an 'imbrication version' of the buck-passing account. This account allows that value-properties can be reason-giving properties without abandoning the claim that, in the end, the buck is passed to reasons. I defend Williams' claim that reasons are internal reasons against criticisms from McDowell and Parfit.; There are restrictions other than a connection to A's current motivations, that are necessary for correct reason ascriptions to A. One problem is to understand how we can avoid diluting the notion of A's having a reason to absurdity. Why, for instance, it is absurdly implausible to say, when A is at a party, that A has a reason to bake bread, even if there is a sound deliberative route from her motivations to the conclusion to bake bread? My answer relies on explicating the notion of a context, which can place robust, if contestable, constraints on reason-ascription.; My discussion rounds off with a further look at the relations between reasons, attitudes, and values. I confront a serious problem for any buck-passing account of value (and similar accounts)---the "wrong kinds of reasons" problem. In what principled way can the buck-passer distinguish between reasons that are of the right kind and reasons that are of the wrong kind to make for value? Consider a case in which an evil demon threatens to punish me if I do not admire him for his own sake. It seems I have a reason to admire the demon, given to me by the demon. The buck-passing account seems to be committed to the claim then, that, by virtue of this, the demon is admirable, which is rather counterintuitive. I argue that all putative "wrong kinds of reasons scenarios" are either absurdities or cases of the right kinds of reasons.