Enforcing environmental regulations in Hubei Province, China: Agencies, courts, citizens

This dissertation examines the application of the Administrative Litigation law (ALL) promulgated in China in 1989 that became effective in 1990. The context for the study is the enforcement of environmental regulations in Hubei Province. The primary objective of the ALL is to empower citizens to challenge agency decisions in courts through "administrative litigation cases" (ALCs). A minor clause in the ALL allows administrative agencies to sue regulated parties for non-compliance with administrative decisions, also known as "non-litigation administrative execution cases" (NAECs). This research uses the ALCs and NAECs involving local environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) in Hubei Province in 1992-2005 to explore the legal processes and outcomes of those cases and their effects on EPB enforcement behavior.;Most ALL-related studies have concentrated on ALCs. The absence of empirical studies on NAECs indicates the incomplete and unbalanced scholarly understanding of the ALL. My study employs a qualitative research method involving multiple case studies to investigate both ALCs and NAECs. Two counties and one district in Hubei Province were chosen as the case study locations. A key factor for selecting Hubei as my study area is the critical access I gained to court records, judges, and local EPBs in the province. During my field research in April 2005--July 2006, I collected relevant archival court records and official documents from both courts and EPBs. I also conducted a total of 140 in-depth, person-to-person interviews with judges, EPB officials, ordinary citizens involved in ALCs, polluters, lawyers, and other involved local officials. A key paradox found in this dissertation is that agencies, EPBs in this context, deployed the ALL far more extensively than citizens, even though the original intent of the ALL was to empower citizens by giving them a mechanism for challenging agency decisions. Local EPBs employed the law strategically to enhance their enforcement powers.;My analysis finds that the implementation of the ALL has been largely driven by ALL-related incentives faced by the courts and EPBs, and these incentives have led EPBs to use the courts as a tool to enhance their enforcement power. EPBs, as weak regulatory agencies, have used court assistance strategically to improve their ability to collect pollution levies and fines, primarily from small businesses in the tertiary sector. Courts, on the other hand, used NAECs to fulfill their ALL-related caseload requirements and gain additional revenues. In my three case study locations, the ALL's primary goal of protecting citizens' rights and interests was marginalized in practice.;Although court review through both ALCs and NAECs has led EPBs to become more sensitive to legal issues and to follow the letter of the law more closely when enforcing environmental regulations, it failed to correct the displaced goals of EPB enforcement of the pollution levy system: instead of emphasizing pollution reduction, EPBs continue to focus on collecting levies to generate revenues by using court assistance. Moreover, court review has done little to reduce EPBs' arbitrary exercise of their own discretion in setting amounts of and collecting levies and fines.;My research contributes to a more complete understanding of ALL by demonstrating the emphasis on use of NAECs in practice. This subject (as compared to ALCs) has received little attention. Notwithstanding the relatively small number of ALCs and seemingly dominant effects of NAECs on EPB behavior, my study shows that the ALL has long-run potential for placing EPB enforcement behavior under the supervision of courts and citizens. In addition, my study provides policy-relevant information to Chinese decision makers for enhancing the supervision of local environmental enforcement by using courts and citizens.