| According to many analysts, September 11th showed that globalization has empowered terrorists to reach out and kill from across the world. But does globalization necessarily make violent transnational non-state actors’ job easier? How and when does geography still matter to globetrotting groups like al-Qaeda and the mafia, if it does?;Using longitudinal and cross-case comparisons, I look at the logistics networks, command and control structures, and training programs of three types of Southeast Asian clandestine transnational organizations with different conceptions of territory: the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah, the separatist insurgency Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), and maritime pirates and smugglers. The territorial ideas of these groups combine with physical geography and the political conditions they face to influence the routes and methods they use as they try to carry out transnational activities. Because political pressure makes the groups dependent on the physical topography and infrastructure of the border they are trying to cross, their activities are shaped in ways that make their behavior predictable, and their success precarious, regardless of modern communications and transportation. The scope and nature of groups’ territorial ambitions also influence how flexible those aspirations are when faced with changes in the political environment. Groups with larger and more abstract territorial ambitions adapt and entrench themselves in new countries, and success in their transnational activities can result in a reconfiguration of their territorial aspirations, to the detriment of the new target countries’ security.;Using territory and ideas about territory as a foundation, the transnational behavior of all these groups can be explained and compared without sacrificing analytical clarity or policy relevance. The theory can be used to explain how, for example, Jemaah Islamiyah transformed from a local Indonesian group to one fighting across Southeast Asia for a pan-Islamic caliphate. It can also explain why GAM held on for so long against the Indonesian military, but ultimately failed in its quest for an independent Aceh. Finally, it can tell us why some organized criminal syndicates disappear under pressure, while others metastasize into new transnational threats. After developing the theory, I test it on Uyghur ethnic separatism in China and Central Asia. |
