| When war breaks out, why do some formerly peaceful citizens decide to become rebel soldiers? I demonstrate that participation in a rebellion, widely considered a reflexive, emotional, or otherwise irrational decision, can be a rational response given a set of wartime constraints. Empirical results from a 3000-observation survey of former soldiers and civilians in Burundi show that rebels who fought in Burundi's civil war often exhibited rational, even calculated decision-making in choosing whether or not to join the rebel army. Feeling that their political options had been exhausted, potential rebels weighed benefits against costs and decided to fight based on the results. For many, the benefits were compelling: a victory for the rebels could translate into an increase in social, political and economic status, after years of state-sponsored discrimination had limited participation in such institutions as the government, the army and the educational system. Moreover, joining the rebels offered individuals a chance to receive protection for themselves, their families and their communities. The costs, on the other hand, were often comparable to the costs of remaining a civilian, given the extent to which young Hutu males were targeted for reprisals by the government army. Individuals who decided that the benefits they could reap if they were to help the rebels succeed outweighed the costs of fighting made a logical choice: to abandon their former lives and become rebel soldiers. |
