Externalism and phenomenal content

Today, it is widely accepted that the contents of perceptual experiences are determined by relations to the external world. This assumption is called 'psychological externalism'. Still, the idea that phenomenal experiences are inner qualities in the head survives and shows up in many different guises. The assumption that psychological externalism is compatible with internalism about phenomenal character is called 'Contemporary Internalism'. The dissertation is an attempt to explain why this assumption should be rejected and tries to make phenomenal externalism a bit more plausible. Chapter 1 lays out some basic ideas and key positions that provide the background for recent discussions on the topic. Then, a brief overview of what follows is given. In Chapter 2, the traditional view that Qualia are directly introspectible sensational properties is contrasted with the moderate versions of Ned Block and Sydney Shoemaker that attempt to render Qualia compatible with psychological externalism. It will be argued that these attempts fail. Chapter 3 explores Contemporary-Internalist views which reject Qualia and insist that perceptual experiences contain modes of presentation which determine phenomenal character. This strategy comprises the view that posits a crucial kind of 'phenomenal intentionality' that is grounded on the phenomenal character of experience alone, the functionalist view which holds that experience has its phenomenal character in virtue of its distinctive internal causal role, and Fregean representationalism which construes modes of presentations as having built-in satisfaction conditions. It is argued that neither of the accounts preserves phenomenal internalism, at least, not in a way that is compatible with even a very restricted commitment to psychological externalism. Chapter 4 shows why representationalism, the most influential approach to phenomenal consciousness, is unacceptably internalist, by either introducing 'two levels' of phenomenal character, or by attempting to reduce phenomenal character to a distinctive kind of nonconceptual content. Chapter 5 argues that the most robust kind of phenomenal externalism is direct realism, which is the view that the objects of perception are, quite literally, constituents of perceptual experience. The most plausible version of direct realism, so it is argued, is offered by a sensorimotor account of perception.