| Spinoza has a fascinating account of akrasia. Locating it is well worth the labor involved, however. First, his theory is of historical significance, because it involves certain views normally thought to originate in Hume. So Spinoza, whom Hume read, should be given some of the credit for these novelties. Second, Spinoza's theory combines several intuitive aspects of positions generally thought to be mutually exclusive. In this regard, Spinoza's theory of akrasia is conceptually unique, a coherent hybrid view that may capture the good of the opposing views while avoiding their pitfalls. Finally, his theory of akrasia is plausible and satisfying, capturing those intuitions we want in a theory of akrasia. It presents akratic action as it must be understood---as freely and intentionally performed, irrational action against our better judgment.; The thrust of this work can be stated as follows: Spinoza has an interesting and viable account of akrasia. That account is a weak judgment internalism that resembles Aristotle's and Alfred Mele's, though it also appeals to certain Humean intuitions. Specifically, according to Spinoza, akrasia occurs for an agent S just when the power of S's irrational desire for y, which involves an irrational judgment that y is a good course of action, will surpass the power of S's rational desire for x, which involves a rational judgment that x is the better course of action; this account of akrasia is plausible and superior to its competitors, in that it better accommodates our intuitions concerning akratic conduct.; After discussing competing theories of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, David Hume, Donald Davidson, and Alfred Mele, I survey Spinoza's affective psychology and thoughts on human bondage. In the final chapter, I evaluate Spinoza's theory of akrasia vis-a-vis the competing theories. I conclude that his account captures the heart of strict akrasia---that we can affirm contradictory judgments and feel conflicting desires. And so, strict akrasia is easily explainable. Of course, it is still irrational, because it involves acting against our better judgment which, for Spinoza, means acting against our universal principles in favor of some inadequately known particular. |
