Almost war: Britain, Germany, and the Bosnia crisis, 1908--1909

Austria-Hungary's annexation of the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 1908 triggered a prolonged dispute, not only with Turkey but also with Serbia and Russia, where Pan-Serbs and Pan-Slavs demanded compensation for the "Germanic"' seizure of Slav land. The crisis resembled that of July 1914 in both its South Slav origins and its Great Power dimensions.; The dispute escalated to a Great Power crisis because of decisions by both Britain and Germany to support their respective partners, Russia and Austria-Hungary. British and German policies contrasted sharply. Intent on consolidating his Entente system, British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey professed disinterest but reinforced Russo-Serb intransigence with repeated private promises of diplomatic support. The Germans took the reverse approach; Chancellor Bernhard von Bulow outwardly trumpeted Nibelungentreue, but privately encouraged Austro-Russian compromise. He especially advocated creation of a tripartite Habsburg Empire, granting "South Slavs" autonomy and equality alongside Austria and Hungary. Hungary, however, opposed any such plan and made its rejection a condition of ratifying the annexation.; Bulow, seeking peace, cooperated with the French as a channel to the Russians and the Austrians. Grey, dreading continental combinations, worked to counter these efforts. Both Germany and Britain employed deterrence and hinted at tolerance for war. Creative diplomacy by Habsburg foreign minister Alois yon Aehrenthal, merging British and German initiatives, finally ensured a political solution. Though almost war, the Bosnia Crisis ended in peace. Why? And why not in 1914? The dissertation suggests the need for studying success and failure in waging peace as a key to explaining the origins of World War I.