Hume's master analogy (David Hume)

I examine the dual-role of analogy in Hume's philosophy: first, analogy functions as a principal influence in the generation of experiential belief; second, analogy is fundamental in the extension of scientific explanations beyond their original domain of application. I examine these two overlapping but distinct functions of analogy in Hume's philosophy.; The first project is to develop an account of Humean analogical probability and to assess its place within Hume's broader theory of experiential reasoning. I develop a Humean causal-role account of relevance, and show how this approach can avoid objections to Hume's resemblance-based theory of general ideas. After describing analogical effects within Hume's system of belief-production, I argue that these results have consequences for our understanding of Hume's skepticism regarding the correspondence between our subjective degrees of belief and objective frequencies. I conclude that, since there is no equivalent of the Principle of Indifference for the case of analogical inference, the degree of the analogical influence on the generation of probable belief is intrinsically idiosyncratic, and therefore cannot be identified with any objective frequency or ratio of favorable to possible cases.; The second project demonstrates the role of analogy in the extension of theoretical explanations by analyzing Hume's analogy between human and animal reasoning. I argue that Hume's purpose is to convince us that his system provides the best explanation of experiential reasoning because it can account for both animal and human reasoning from the same general mechanisms. The animal analogy provides additional confirmation for Hume's theory of mind because it can be extended to explain an analogous domain of phenomena. My interpretation also allows for differences between the human and animal mind, such as the capacity for reflective thought, without undermining the legitimacy of the inference. Indeed, while Hume asserts that animals think, in my view he denies that they think about thinking. Denying reflective thought to animals carries dramatic implications; much of our cognitive inventory will be absent from the animal's mental ontology. However, I argue that my interpretation of Hume on higher-order refection violates neither Hume's commitment to naturalism nor his rejection of rationalist cognitive faculties.