'With a little help from our friends:'1 The development of combat intelligence in the American Expeditionary Forces, 1917--1918

The United States Army, like its counterparts in Europe, especially the United Kingdom, struggled to achieve recognition as a profession during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The Army developed educational institutions, improved standards of conduct, and further developed specialized knowledge in areas such as intelligence. US army officers and military officials sponsored these changes knowing and sometimes adapting from similar developments in other armies. When the First World War started in 1914, the American army was close to par with the British army in its development of intelligence as a specialized field and body of military knowledge.;By 1917, Britain and the other belligerents had tremendously advanced their intelligence practices as part of the broader development of warfighting techniques through three years of warfare. Britain's army had expanded twenty-fold, new capabilities such as aerial photography and signal interception had developed and matured, and classic techniques for intelligence collection, such as prisoner interrogations, had been further refined and systemized. US army officers observed some of these developments but lacked resources or support to incorporate them into American practice. By the time the United States entered the war in April 1917, the army had fallen far behind the forces of the other belligerents in its strength, organization, and doctrine.;The American army needed assistance to be successful in battle: it had to grow in size just as the British army had done while at the same time modernizing its practices. Some historians have criticized this American effort. Among those receiving blame for American shortcomings is General John J. Pershing, the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). According to these historians, Pershing's rejection of allied trench warfare methods and espousal of his own "open warfare" methods, which were neither clearly defined nor adequately trained, degraded the combat ability of the AEF. While this explanation for the AEF's shortcomings has merit, the AEF actually drew greatly upon allied experiences in a variety of areas, including artillery, aviation, tanks, and intelligence.;American officers adopted allied intelligence organization, methods, and training into the AEF. Allied officers in the British and French missions who traveled to the United States in April and May 1917 provided many details of their organization and methods. Major Dennis E. Nolan, who became the head of AEF intelligence in France, drew upon the information provided in these missions, information collected by military attaches, and information he gained from personal observation of the British and French armies in the field to draw up the first American intelligence regulations. These regulations were in many cases word for word the same as the British Second Army intelligence instructions given to him while at the British front. From battalion level to the AEF General Headquarters (GHQ), Nolan largely adopted British intelligence organization for the AEF. Any differences in doctrine and organization from the British model reflected a choice to employ French methods or preexisting American methods.;1The title is inspired by the Beatles song, "With a Little Help From My Friends," Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band, 1967.