| This dissertation consists of theoretical and empirical analysis of problems of asymmetric information and uncertainty, with applications to the politics of climate change. Chapter 2 presents an examination of interest group funded policy research. The model is general, but is motivated by interest group funded climate change research over the past 20 years. I find that for a range of parameter values, in equilibrium the interest group sometimes funds---but never discloses---research. This effectively 'jams' the signal of the policy maker, as the interest group's strategic funding changes the distribution of research that appears in the public domain. This makes the policy maker worse off as a result of interest group research funding, despite all research being unbiased. The results provide theoretical support for the importance of research funding transparency and implications for the interpretation of interest group funded research.;The third chapter is an empirical study of belief updating. Most studies of belief updating use experimental data. I use a novel, real world data source---the Associated Press (AP) college football poll, a weekly subjective ranking of the top 25 teams---to test the validity of Bayes' rule as a descriptive model of the belief updating process. I use historical score data and final rank frequencies to estimate Bayesian ranking changes, from week to week. I compare estimated Bayesian to observed ranking changes, and find evidence of both Bayesian updating and systematic over and underreaction to new information. Overreaction is associated with the salience of new information, and lack of salience of strong priors.;In Chapter 4 I investigate the theory that government research funding agencies favored researchers who promoted the threat of climate change. The motivation for this favoritism, according to the theory, was that the agencies stood to benefit as the public's, and Congress's, fear of the threat grew, as this enabled the agencies to obtain greater budgetary power. I use data from the RAND RaDiUS database of federal research funding, the Oregon Petition and the Journal of Climate for the empirical analysis. On the whole, the evidence in support of the theory is weak.;Keywords: Persuasion Games, Research Funding, Information Search, Bayesian Updating, Overreaction, Underreaction, Economics of Bureaucracy, Climate Change... |
