The Study On Influence Of Political Promotion For State-owned Enterprise Executives To Over-investment

The senior executives of Chinese state-owned enterprise(SOE)have the dual status of “political man” and “economic man”.The “political man” status gives the senior executives in SOE the administrative positions and the space and channel of political promotion.Normally,we call the promotion of administrative position of the senior executives in SOE as political promotion.In most cases,the status of “political man” is more pronounced for the senior executives in SOE.The promotion of administrative position is more attractive than the salary income of positions.There exists over-investment phenomenon in Chinese state-owned enterprises for a long time.The main reason for over-investment of enterprises is the self-interest behavior of senior executives,and the effective measure to solve self-interest behavior of senior executives is the incentive contract of senior executives.Then as the special incentive contract for senior executives in SOE,whether political promotion could restrain the self-interest of senior executives in SOE to solve the “chronic problem” of over-investment of SOE or not.On the other hand,Central and local governments have the power to assess and promote senior executives in SOE,and senior executives in SOE with the motivation for political promotion often show political ingratiatory behavior,then whether government intervention influence incentive effects of senior executives in SOE,thus influence over-investment of enterprises caused by self-interest behavior of senior executives in SOE or not.Above all,this paper attempts to create an analytical framework of “government intervention,political promotion of senior executives,agency costs and over-investment of enterprises”,and theoretically analyzes and empirically tests the influences of the political promotion of senior executives in SOE on over-investment of enterprises,and the action mechanism played by government intervention and agency costs,thus tests incentive effects for political promotion of senior executives in SOE to reveal institutional origin causes of over-investment in SOE.Based on the idea of “theoretical analysis-empirical testing-policy suggestions”,the main research contents include the following three aspects: firstly,on the basis of literature review and theoretical analysis,this paper explains the influence mechanism of the political promotion of senior executives in SOE on the over-investment of enterprises and then lays a foundation for the subsequent empirical study.Secondly,this paperselects the A-share non-financial state-owned listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009 to 2016 as the research sample,and uses the balanced panel data and the mixed cross-section regression analysis method to empirically test the effect of political promotion of SOE executives on over-investment and its mechanism.More specifically,this paper examines and compares the differences in the impact of “internal promotion” and “external promotion” of the senior executive in state-owned enterprises on over-investment,and examines the intermediary effect of agency cost on the influence of political promotion of senior executives in SOE on over-investment,and then examines the moderating effect of government intervention on the influence of political promotion of senior executives in SOE on over-investment.Thirdly,according to the results of theoretical analysis and empirical test,we summarize the research conclusions and innovations in this paper,and put forward policy recommendations to the state-owned assets supervision and administration facilities and to the SOE.Finally the insufficiency and next research direction of this paper are pointed.Concentrating on the core issues for the influence mechanism of political promotion of senior executives in SOE on over-investment,this paper uses the methods of literature analysis,theoretical deduction,statistical analysis and panel data analysis and to draw the following three main conclusions: firstly,there is a positive correlation between the political promotion of senior executives in SOE and the degree of over-investment,especially between the “external promotion” of senior executives in SOE and the degree of over-investment.Secondly,agency cost plays a part of intermediary role in the influence of political promotion of senior executives in SOE on over-investment,especially in the sample of “external promotion”,the mediation effect is more significant.Thirdly,government intervention plays a moderating role in the influence of political promotion of senior executives in SOE on over-investment,and this moderating effect also significant in the samples of “internal promotion” and “external promotion”.The innovations of this paper are mainly embodied in the following three aspects: First of all,from the perspective of research,it broadens the research on the formation mechanism of over-investment in Chinese SOE.This paper enriches the theory of “government intervention” of the over-investment in enterprises,and reveals the influence mechanism of the political promotion of senior executives on the over investment in SOE,which explains the internal transmission mechanism of agency cost and the external regulation mechanism of government intervention.Secondly,in terms of research content,it enriches and develops the research on the incentive effect of political promotion of senior executives in SOE.This paper proves the existence of the negative incentive effect of executive political promotion in SOE,and this negative incentive effect is influenced by the intensity of government intervention and the political promotion channels of SOE executives.Thirdly,in terms of research methods,the government intervention index of composite indicators is constructed from the perspective of heterogeneity characteristics of Chinese SOE.This paper chooses four indicators: regional market differences,types of industrial characteristics,types of government control and types of controlling shareholder,and uses valuation method to construct government intervention index of composite indicators,which is innovative in research methods.