| Corporate dividend distribution behavior has always been an important research field at home and abroad.As the core financial decision-making of an enterprise,healthy dividend distribution can make the capital market develop healthily,at the same time,it can help to safeguard the reasonable interests of shareholders and accelerate the development of the enterprise.In recent years,many listed companies in our country have appeared the phenomenon of "light cash dividend,pay more attention on stock dividends and stock splits",when making distribution plans,which is significantly different from the current situation that listed companies prefer cash dividend in mature capital markets.At the same time,scholars find that there are obvious problems in the performance and quality of the stock dividends’ and stock splits’ companies.Many listed companies consider the stock dividends and stock splits of interests of insiders more when they carry out the these policy.Essentially,the policy of stock dividends and stock splits will not directly increase the performance and profitability of enterprises.It is only an internal adjustment of shareholders’ rights and interests,but not a substantive advantage.However,when listed companies announce stock dividends and stock splits plans every year,there will be a strong response to the market,especially those high proportion of stock dividendsandstocksplits plans can always attract investors to pay attention to and buy in the short term,resulting in the current situation of our country,the stock dividends and stock splits is prone to irrational pricing.High stock prices bring huge profits to the insiders of listed companies,which leads to the conflict of interests between insiders and minority shareholders in the stock dividends and splits policy.Therefore,from the perspective of conflict of interests,the analysis of the relationship between internal personnel power can not only broaden the perspective of research on the motivation of stock dividendsandsplits,but also help the listed companies,regulators,small and medium-sized investors in China to correctly understand and face the decision-making of stock dividends and splits,which has a certain guiding role in theory and practice.Based on the sample data of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2018,this paper examines the influence of managerial power on the stock dividends and splits from the perspective of self-interest motivation and ability of the policy-making units by combining theoretical analysis with empirical research.Firstly,using the conflict of interests between the large shareholders and their agents’ executives and the small and medium shareholders in the agency theory,this paper analyses the possible motivation of stock dividends and splits by listed companies;then,based on the incomplete contract theory,agency theory and crew theory,it analyses the influence of managerial power on the stock dividends and splits;then,it constructs a mathematical model.Regression model uses descriptive statistics,principal component analysis and multiple regression to verify the hypothesis.In order to ensure the robustness of the conclusion,some measures are adopted,such as changing the measurement method of interpreted variables,replacing regression model,selecting lagging one-stage interpreted variables as instrumental variables,and PSM tendency matching method.Finally,according to the research conclusion,the paper puts forward corresponding suggestions and measures for the stock dividends and splits under the influence of managerial power.Specifically,the main contents and conclusions of this study are as follows:Firstly,from the perspective of conflict of interest,this paper analyses the motivation of stock dividends and splits.In the traditional dividend distribution theory,signal theory,liquidity theory,equity expansion theory,catering theory and so on are used to explain the stock dividend and the incentive of increasing shares.In recent years,irrational pricing has been prevalent in the secondary market of our country.There are obvious conflicts of interest between insiders and small and medium-sized shareholders.Insiders have the "economic man" mentality of expecting personal gains through the premium of stock dividends and splits.Small and medium-sized investors are easily attracted by low-price stocks because of "price illusion",but lack of relevant internal information of enterprises,resulting in internal personnel in a dominant position in the conflict of interests.At this time,it is easy for internal personnel to encroach on the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders by stock dividends and splits.Secondly,based on agency theory and crew theory,this paper analyses the differences of preferences of senior executives for stock dividends and splits under different roles.Generally speaking,in the analysis of senior managers’ behavior,the agency theory is based on the hypothesis of rational "economic man" of senior managers.The default is that the behavior of senior managers is aimed at maximizing their own interests and does not care about the interests of corporate collectives and shareholders.However,this assumption neglects the attribute of "social man" of senior managers.Specifically,the heavier formal power is in the power composition of senior managers,the more senior managers hope to influence enterprises through their own authoritative status and formal institutional arrangements.At this time,the motivation of executive self-interest power is obviously easier to position themselves as "economic man".The heavier the informal power in the composition of managerial power,the more eager the executive is to influence the enterprise to bring better performance through his ability,knowledge,resources and personality.At this time,the tendency of executive collectivism is obvious,and the more likely he is to position himself as "social man".Based on the analysis of the role orientation of senior executives,this paper examines the relationship between executive formal power,informal power and stock dividends and splits,and finds that when stock dividends and splits may become an insider’s profit-making tool:(1)there is a significant positive correlation between managerial power and stock dividends and splits;(2)there is a significant positive correlation between managerial organizational power and stock dividends and splits;(3)there is a significant negative correlation between managerial individual power and stock dividends and splits.These conclusions indicate that the power of senior managers affects the positioning of their human roles,and further affects the preferences of senior managers for profitable equity transfer policies.On the basis of the above research conclusions,this paper constructs a comprehensive index of managerial power through principal component analysis of eight indicators.Regressing the relationship between the comprehensive index of managerial power and the stock dividends and splits,it is found that the bigger the comprehensive power of senior managers,the bigger the tendency and proportion of enterprises’ stock dividends and splits.This shows that formal power is the core source of power in the power system of senior managers.In most scenarios,executives will position themselves as rational "economic man" aiming at maximizing their own interests.Thirdly,based on the goal of maximizing the interests of internal staff,this paper studies the difference of the influence of managerial power on the policy of stock dividends and splits.Under the influence of comprehensive power,executives are rational "economic men" who pursue the maximization of benefits.Therefore,when there are differences in returns between the policy of sending shares and adding shares,executives will choose the most advantageous allocation scheme through power.Generally speaking,because the effect of the stock dividends and splits is similar to that of foreign stock splitting,the academic and practical circles tend to study the two kinds of distribution behavior together,but if we consider from the perspective of maximizing the interests of internal personnel,there is a certain cost-benefit difference between the stock dividendsand transfer of provident fund into increased shares.Specifically speaking,the premise of the policy is that there is a net profit after tax that can be allocated to the enterprise,which limits the behavior of the insiders of many listed companies with poor performance to manipulate the stock price for profit through the policy,and then choose the policy of adding shares without restrictions.At the same time,because of the policy of sending shares and cash dividend,the policy of transferring shares has no restrictions.Sample belongs to the real sense of profit distribution,so after the implementation of the policy,shareholders need to pay individual income tax to the state,which invisibly increases the cost of internal personnel making profits through the policy,so executives and large shareholders may prefer the way of converting capital reserve into equity to control stock prices;finally,the policy of sending shares.Policies often need to be paid out at the same time according to regulations,which reduces the cash flow that can be controlled by senior managers,on the other hand,increases the demand for external funds of enterprises,makes more institutions participate in the process of supervising senior managers,and limits the power of senior managers.Therefore,under the influence of managerial power,insiders are more likely to adopt the policy of increasing shares rather than the policy of stock dividend in order to maximize their interests.This hypothesis has also been confirmed by empirical test.Fourthly,the impact of the interaction between managerial power and agency conflict on the stock dividends and splits is studied.The influence of managerial power on stock dividends and splits stems from the conflict of interests between insiders and small and medium-sized shareholders.The more serious the agency conflict is,the more self-interest tendencies exist between executives and large shareholders.At the same time,the lower the cost,the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders can be encroached on,which aggravates the "economic man" mentality of executives.Rational positioning and self-interest behavior.The research finds that:(1)there is a mutual promotion between the comprehensive power of senior executives and the severity of agency conflict,which can positively stimulate the stock dividends and splits of enterprises;(2)the interaction between formal power and agency conflict of senior executives can have a positive impact on the stock dividends and splits,and there is no interaction between informal power of senior executives and agency conflict.This shows that the interaction between managerial power and agency conflict is mainly reflected in the path of formal power.Fifthly,this paper studied the stock dividend policy’ effect under the influence of managerial power,found that it is not conducive to the growth of corporate performance.It is found that the policy of stock dividend and splits under the influence of managerial power does not match the performance and future development of enterprises.It can not efficiently transmit the performance signals of enterprises and expand the capital of enterprises.Under the influence of power,stock dividends and splits policy is more a means of transferring the interests of internal personnel,and inefficiently allocating and consuming the resources of enterprise development.It inhibits the growth of enterprise.Compared with the existing literature,this study has the following contributions:(1)Constructing the path of managerial powers’ influencing the t stock dividends and splitsThis paper,from the perspective of theory and practice,analyses the path that the manageroal power of listed companies affects stock dividends and splits.Mangerial power not only affects their own interest motivation and behavior decision-making in stock dividends and splits,but also indirectly affects the conflict of interest between large shareholders and small shareholders in stock dividends and splits,which makes the managerial power influence the formulation of stock dividends and splits of listed companies through both direct and indirect aspects.Compared with the existing literature,this paper establishes the mechanism and path of the influence of managerial power on the stock dividends and splits of listed companies.(2)Expanding the research perspective of the motivation of stock dividends and splitsThis paper analyses the factors influencing the formulation of the stock dividends and splits of listed companies from the perspective of conflict of interests,which will help scholars and investors to have a more thorough understanding of the interest-related problems existing in the transfer policy under the current situation of our country,and help investors return to rationality and reduce the corresponding speculative behavior.(3)Enriching the theoretical research on the role orientation of human nature of senior managersThis paper deeply analyses the different role orientation of senior managers under the influence of power,different psychological role orientation produces different behavioral motivation,different behavioral motivation ultimately has different impact on the policy of stock dividends and splits.Taking "economic man" and "social man" as the breakthrough point,this paper studies the behavioral preference of senior managers,enriching the relevant high.The research perspective of human role and behavior preference. |
