| After more than forty years of reform and opening-up,China's economic strength is growing and China is becoming much more competitive in the international market.Under the strategy of "One belt One Road" and "Made in China 2025”,more and more Chinese companies are stepping out of China.More and more Chinese companies are acquiring overseas companies has its reasons.From China side,loose policy of overseas acquisition,enough foreign exchange reserve provide solid material base;the implementation of national development strategy and the appreciation of RMB provide the motivation of overseas acquisition.From the global side,as China is becoming much more important,many companies in the developed countries realize the importance of the cooperation with Chinese companies.As Chinese private companies are becoming more competitive and the government provides more support to them,many Chinese private companies begin to participate in the overseas acquisition.But as many private companies are lack of management experience of overseas acquisition and they are not so familiar with the investment environment and culture in other countries,there are problems in strategies and management after the acquisition.When looking back of the overseas acquisition of Chinese private companies,it could be found that many Chinese private companies are short in understanding the German culture,corporate governance,laws and regulations,and as a result,the management after the acquisition becomes a problem for Chinese private companies.How should Chinese private companies manage the German companies,build the manager team and hire the CEO,and how the CEO power should be allocated so that it could maximize its management effect,is the focus of theoretical study and management practice.CEO power allocation in the German companies will be studied,with the related theories of economical sociology,economic and management.Started fr-om the difference between the two countries,the theoretical assumption of relationship between CEO power allocation and acquisition performance will be suggested,with SEM tool AMOS22.0 and statistical software SPSS22.0,a test model for the relationship between CEO power allocation and acquisition will be built.In this model,CEO power allocation is the explanatory variable,acquisition performance is the explained variable,organizational change and corporate governance are the mediation variable,besides,cultura:l integration and trust level are the moderator variable.With more variables,the difficulty of study increases.Data of this model comes from the interview and questionnaire of the managers from more than German companies that are acquired by Chinese companies in 16 federal states in Germany.197 questionnaires are collected back,the number of questionnaires meet the standard of SEM model.The article is divided into four parts:firstly,what is the CEO power allocation?Secondly,why should the CEO power allocated?Thirdly,how should the CEO power allocated?Fourthly,how should it be tested that the CEO power allocation is reasonable and effective?Based on these questions,the following work will be done.Firstly,concepts are clarified.Basic concepts will be explained,and theories of the CEO power allocation are expanded based on the previous studies.Secondly,Chinese private companies' acquisition in Germany is introduced,with the aim of pointing out that CEO power allocation is different in Chinese and German companies,also the form of CEO power allocation will be compared.Thirdly,it is pointed out that CEO power in German company consists of four dimensions,namely ownership power,organization power,reputation power and expert power.Also CEO power allocation consists of four dimensions,and CEO ownership power is realized through stock-based incentive compensation and stock incentive;CEO organization power is realized through shareholders' authorization or becoming the internal Board Director in the parent company;CEO reputation and expert power is strengthened through material and spiritual rewards.Most of the CEO power allocation in the German companies has its convergence.It's also pointed out that CEO power allocation should be dominated by efficiency mechanism,so that the lowest cost could achieve the best power allocation effect;besides,CEO power allocation should meet law and social cognition standards and also should be affected by social network.Fourthly,the article explains that effective and reasonable CEO power allocation will improve the company management,which will affect the acquisition performance.At last,a model is built and it's found that there are two ways that CEO power allocation will affect the acquisition power,one of the way is that CEO power allocation will affect the acquisition performance directly,the other way is that with organizational change as mediator,the CEO power allocation affects the acquisition performance.Also with the model it is found that,corporate internal governance and the trust level do not affect the CEO power allocation and the acquisition performance that much,and the effect of cultural integration is uncertainty.By here the study is not over,combined with the work practice,the theoretical model of CEO power allocation will be tested.Based on the research above,the article comes up with the suggestions of the CEO power allocation,with the view of transnational corporation governance from Chinese private company investors:the CEO power allocation should be contractual;the CEO power allocation should have its boundaries,and should not cross the baseline;the management effect of the CEO power allocation should be supervised;the CEO power allocation should be actively adjusted and transferred when necessary.Value and innovation in this article:Firstly,the theoretical value of this article is that,started from the cultural difference between China and Germany,the CEO power allocation in the acquired Germany companies will be discussed,and the shortage of the theory in explaining the transnational corporate governance in some countries will be covered.Secondly,assumption and the related strategy of the CEO power allocation will be suggested,which will be a help for Chinese private companies when it comes to the acquisition of Germany companies.Thirdly,as can seen,there are few research in the business development and internal value improvement in the acquired Germany company,thus this article could be a reference for further research.Fourthly,combined the characteristics of Chinese private companies' property rights with the practice of the CEO power allocation in the acquired Germany companies,some related hypotheses will be suggested,which will be a supply in this research field.Due to the limit of objective conditions,there are still some limitations and deficiencies in this article,for example,the information disclosure is not so enough because of confidential principles and there is a limit in collecting samples and information,which should be further explored and improved. |
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