The State-owned Assets Regulatory Revolution And Its Effect On The Investment Efficiency Of State-owned Enterprises

During the 40 years of reform and opening-up,China has maintained a long period of rapid economic growth and achieved remarkable economic achievements,becoming the world's second-largest economy after the United States,which has been hailed as "China's economic miracle".The main reason of these economic achievements is that China has gradually shifted from the planned economy system to the socialist market economy system.However,China's economic development and economic management system,especially the state-owned enterprise management system,there are still many unresolved problems.The success of state-owned enterprise reform is closely connected with the development of all aspects of our country,which determines whether our economy can continue to maintain the high speed development,evade the "middle income trap" in economic development,and enter the sequence of higher income countries.After the Party's 18 th session,the central government especially put forward that the market plays a decisive role in allocating resources and plays a better role in the administration,and clearly takes "management capital" as the main step to accelerate the function change of the state-owned Assets supervision system.A new round of reform of state-owned enterprises has been carried out in full swing throughout the country.How to deepen the reform of state-owned assets,how to improve the efficiency of state-owned enterprises,and become the important issue that the government,SASAC,state-owned enterprise and even the whole people pay attention to.Based on our country's basic national conditions and system background,this paper on the basis of reviewing the reform of China's state-owned capital and state-owned enterprises,this paper expounds and analyzes the internal logic relationship between the classical theory and the reform of state-owned assets supervision and the state-owned enterprise,and according to the history of the reform of SOEs,They are divided into phases.On this basis,this paper points out the basic problems of current state-owned supervision,and combined with the Central Committee,the State Council and SASAC on the state-owned supervision by the "management of Enterprises","management assets" to "management capital" change of the regulatory reform ideas,with investment(capital operation)as the starting point,seize the main line of capital,through the use of did(double difference)method to construct the model,empirically analyze and test the influence of state-owned supervision reform on state-owned enterprises' excessive investment,merger performance and diversification discount,and get many beneficial conclusions.Firstly,on the basis of reviewing the reform of China's state-owned assets supervision and SOE,this paper expounds and analyzes the internal logic relationship between the classical theory and the reform of state-owned asset regulation and state-owned enterprises.This paper holds that the theory of property Rights provides theoretical guidance for the realization of the "separation of enterprises from the state and the separation of government and capital",and that the theory of division of Labor provides theoretical support for the efficiency improvement brought by separation of government and enterprise and separation of political capital.As a basic feature of the separation of two rights,the theory of asymmetric information points out the main reasons why the separation of two rights may be ineffective,and the principal-agent theory and the theory of corporate governance further provide the theoretical guidance and implementation path for solving this problem.This provides theoretical support and reform enlightenment for the reform of national capital supervision,the establishment of modern enterprise system and the perfection of corporate governance structure of state-owned enterprises.Secondly,this paper makes clear the evolution course of China's state-owned Assets supervision and state-owned enterprise reform,and divides it into three stages according to the course and emphases of the reform of state-owned enterprises,and summarizes the history of the change of investment system and divides it into four stages.In particular,according to the process and emphases of state-owned enterprise reform,the state-owned enterprises are roughly divided into the stage of decentralization,separation of government and capital,and the classification reform in recent years.According to the reform emphases in different period of China's investment system,the reform stage is divided into the starting point of the system Reform(1979 to 1984)and the Comprehensive development of system reform(1984 to 1992),The innovation and depth of system reform(1992 to 2004)and systematization of System reform(from 2004 to present)are four stages.This provides reference and reform enlightenment for the reform of state-owned Assets supervision and state-owned enterprises and the next step of state-owned enterprise investment system.Finally,this paper empirically analyses and examines the influence of state-owned Assets supervision reform on state-owned enterprises' over-investment,merger performance and diversification discount,and obtains the following three empirical conclusions.1.The supervision and reform of state-owned assets has a significant impact on the excessive investment of state-owned enterprises,which can restrain the excessive investment of SOEs and improve the investment efficiency of SOEs,and the effect will be influenced by the marketization degree of the state-owned enterprise,the corporate governance level of SOEs and the asymmetric information of state-owned.As follows:(1)with the strengthening of State-owned supervision,the excessive investment of state-owned enterprises will decrease significantly;(2)in the region with higher marketability,with the strengthening of State-owned enterprises,the problem of excessive investment is inhibited more significantly;(3)the stateowned enterprises with the lower level of corporate governance,with the strengthening of state capital supervision,the more obvious inhibition of over-investment;(4)the state-owned enterprises with higher degree of information asymmetry,with the strengthening of Stateowned supervision,the problem of excessive investment is more obvious.2.The supervision and reform of state-owned assets has a significant impact on the performance of the mergers and acquisitions of state-owned enterprises,which can improve the performance of the mergers and acquisitions of state-owned enterprises and improve the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises.As follows:(1)with the strengthening of the supervision of state-owned enterprises,the performance of mergers and acquisitions will be significantly improved;(2)in the less market-oriented areas,with the strengthening of Stateowned supervision,the positive impact on the performance of mergers and acquisitions is more significant;(3)state-owned enterprises with lower corporate governance level have positive impact on mergers and acquisitions performance with the strengthening of state capital supervision;(4)the state-owned enterprises with higher information asymmetry have more positive influence on their mergers and acquisitions performance with the strengthening of State-owned supervision.3.The reform of state-owned assets supervision has a significant impact on the diversification discount of state-owned enterprises,which can restrain the diversification discount degree of state-owned enterprises and improve the investment efficiency of stateowned enterprises.And the effect will be influenced by the marketization of state-owned enterprises,the corporate governance level of state-owned enterprises.As follows:(1)with the strengthening of State-owned supervision,the diversification discount degree of state-owned enterprises will decrease significantly;(2)in the less market-oriented areas,with the strengthening of State-owned enterprises' supervision,the inhibition of diversification discount is more significant;(3)state-owned enterprises with lower corporate governance level,with the strengthening of State-funded supervision,The inhibition of its diversification discount is more obvious;(4)the state-owned enterprises with higher information asymmetry have more obvious inhibitory effect on their diversification discount with the strengthening of state-funded supervision.To sum up,this paper enriches and expands the research on state-owned Assets supervision and state-owned enterprise reform,state-owned enterprise's excessive investment,state-owned enterprise mergers and acquisitions performance,state-owned enterprise diversification discount,and provides theoretical support and empirical evidence for stateowned Assets supervision,state-owned enterprises reform The main innovation of this article can be summed up in the following three aspects.First,this article from the state-funded supervision of the reform perspective,taking China in the process of transformation as an example,this paper studies the influence of government behavior and state-owned supervision reform on capital investment,provides microcosmic evidence for government behavior influence economic growth,expands enterprise investment theory,and enriches the research on the related fields of the relationship between enterprises and business.Second,this paper makes use of the interim measures of central Enterprise Investment Supervision and management promulgated by the State Council SASAC,as well as the implementation of various policy methods of state-owned enterprises investment supervision,which are issued by provincial and municipal Sasac,for the first time analyzes the influence of state-owned supervision reform on the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises The method empirically analyses and examines the excessive investment of state-owned enterprises by the reform of national capital supervision,the influence of the merger performance and the diversification discount is effective to alleviate the endogenous problem of the existing literatures in the related research,so that we can have a deeper and clearer understanding of the excessive investment,the performance of mergers and acquisitions and the discount of diversification in the state-owned enterprises.And the state-owned enterprises to improve the efficiency of investment to provide new ideas and reform implications.Third,this article on the state-owned enterprises over investment,mergers and acquisitions performance,diversification discount three impact of the research conclusions,as well as the corresponding policy recommendations,on the government's next step of stateowned assets supervision and supervision,as well as the reform direction of state-owned enterprises,how to improve the investment efficiency have important policy value and reference meaning.