| In recent years,the active market of M&A in the capital market has always been the focus of financial studies.Mergers and acquisitions as a way to optimize the allocation of resources helps mergers and integration resources integration.It reduces the competition in the same industry,optimizes the allocation of industry resources and protects the rights and interests of minority shareholders through mergers and acquisitions solution.In the meantime,mergers and acquisitions have also rescued a number of companies in financial distress and promoted the industrial consolidation of industrial policies and industrial restructuring.The reorganization of high-quality assets into listed companies through mergers and acquisitions and replacement is a common way to improve the competitiveness of listed companies.In terms of transaction pricing,major asset reorganization companies mostly rely on the conclusions of asset valuation as their main basis.Assets evaluation has become the core link of asset reorganization.In addition,on October 23,2014,the CSRC promulgated the revised Administrative Measures on Major Assets Reorganization of Listed Companies and introduced the concept of value report.Intermediaries can reduce the asymmetric information on both mergers and acquisitions,thus it improves the performance of mergers and acquisitions.Therefore,the selection of institutional agencies is an important and extensive research area.It is of great theoretical and practical significance to explore the economic consequences of evaluating institutional choices.Furthermore,this paper studies the relationship between the type of institutions and investment scale,over-investment and M&A performance from the microscopic point of view,and analyzes its mechanism of action.The research on this topic has important theoretical and practical significance on how to select the types of agencies to promote the performance of mergers and acquisitions in order to maintain the stability of the financial markets and to order the M&A market.Intermediaries play an important role in the M&A market.Auditors in the mergers and acquisitions of listed companies will not only provide professional audit opinion but also reduce the target enterprise information asymmetry.Moreover,high-reputation auditors improve the success rate of mergers and acquisitions.In mergers and acquisitions,listedcompanies hiring investment banks as financial advisors can also reduce the target information asymmetry and agency costs.In the meantime,the highly reputable investment banks effectively promoted the M&A process.High-reputation rating agencies are also more likely to be the basis for M&A reorganization pricing.As an asset appraisal report or valuation report issued by institutions,valuation agencies provide professional services,reducing the M&A transaction costs and information asymmetry.Moreover,with the promulgation of Decree No.109,the position of valuation agencies in mergers and acquisitions is also increasing.However,there is little research on the role of the existing literature on M&A and reorganization of valuation agencies.Therefore,this paper studies the impact of valuation agencies on investment scale,over-investment and M&A performance,and analyzes its mechanism.In this paper,wind and CSMAR database data are used for empirical research.Through research,the paper draws the following conclusions:First of all,business investment creates value and drives China's rapid economic development.Corporate investment is the focus of financial studies.The scale of investment determines the value of listed companies and it have a profound impact on the real economy.However,the low return on capital of listed companies seriously damages the interests of shareholders(Xin Qingquan et al.,2007).Therefore,the study of investment motivation and its factors are of great significance.M&A has always been the focus of academic research.In particular,the choice of intermediaries in mergers and acquisitions will lead to corporate investment problems,which are also the concerns of the capitial market.Therefore,this paper examines the impact of agency selection on business investment in a micro level and analyzes its mechanism of action.The research on this issue is of great significance for how to choose a valuation agency,and this issue has important theoretical and practical significance in order to maintain the M&A market.Theoretically,in a perfect market,business investment depends on marginal investment returns.However,due to the asymmetric information in the market,in reality,managers collect a large amount of information for processing and consider their own interests,status and other factors to make investment decisions.Among M&A of listed companies,as a fair,equitable and independent "third party" in M&A and reorganization activities,the valuation agencies have been accepted by the market as reference for the pricing of mergers and acquisitions.Therefore,the management of listed companies use theassessment results to complete the merger and reorganization of investment projects.So,in mergers and acquisitions reorganization does the choice of the valuation affect the investment behavior? Does the nature of property and the quality of accounting information affect the impact of the relationship between institutional choice and firm's investment? The research finds that:(1)The other conditions remain unchanged,and the asset appraisal institution reduces the company's investment level;(2)Other conditions remain unchanged,and in mergers and acquisitions of the non-state-owned enterprise the asset appraisal institution reduces the company's investment level of listed companies;(3)Other conditions remain unchanged,and under the condition of high quality of accounting information the asset appraisal institution reduces the company's investment level of the listed company.(4)Other conditions remain unchanged,in other industries with high market competition,the asset appraisal institution reduces the listed company's level of investment scale.(5)Other conditions remain unchanged,in low price synchronization the asset appraisal institution reduces the listed company's level of investment scale.Secondly,this study examines the relationship between institutional types and over-investment in companies.Merger and reorganization is an effective means to allocate the resources of listed companies,and the entire economic history is the history of mergers and acquisitions.In the M&A,the assessment of pricing is one of the key links.According to the requirements of the Measures for the Management of Significant Assets Reorganization of Listed Companies,the pricing of merger and reorganization projects depends on the evaluation of valuation results or valuation reports.Fair,equitable and independent "third parties" in the most M&A and restructuring activities of rating agencies are valued by the market as reference for the pricing of M&A reorganization projects(Wang et al.,2015).The existing literature on excessive investment research is mainly from the perspective of agency theory and manager overconfidence.Jsense(1986)argues that management invests negative net present value(NPV)projects in pursuit of private benefits,which leads to the scale of investment in listed companies.The assessment of institutional options will generate managers confidence and agency issues of investment scale behavior.Therefore,it is meaningful to study the relationship between the listed company's rating agency and the company's over-investment.The research finds that:(1)The other conditions remain unchanged,and the asset appraisal institution reduces the company's over-investment;(2)Other conditions remainunchanged,and in mergers and acquisitions of the non-state-owned enterprise the asset appraisal institution reduces the company's over-investment of listed companies;(3)Other conditions remain unchanged,and under the condition of high quality of accounting information the asset appraisal institution reduces the company's over-investment of the listed company.(4)Other conditions remain unchanged,in other industries with high market competition,the asset appraisal institution reduces the listed company's level of over-investment.(5)Other conditions remain unchanged,in low price synchronization the asset appraisal institution reduces the listed company's level of over-investment.(1)Thirdly,this paper studies the relationship between institutional types and M&A performance.The existing literature mainly studies the impact of corporate governance,network of relationships and political system on M&A performance.No scholars have evaluated the impact of institutional choices on the performance of listed companies after M&A.Asset evaluation agencies and financial advisory agencies in the role of M&A and restructuring of listed companies are mainly to reduce the information asymmetry of mergers and acquisitions and to provide professional assessment opinion.Wangerin(2012)argues that the better the acquisition company understands that the measurement of target accounting information is more adequate,the better the M&A performance is.Mcnichols and Stubben(2015)think the quality of accounting information of the target company improves the company's M&A performance.The assessment agencies and non-assessment agencies,assessment agencies with the association rules and regulations are rather than non-assessment agencies without the rules and regulations.Therefore,the different types of assessment agencies and the degree of disclosure of valuation information on both sides of mergers and acquisitions result in differences in M&A performance.The conclusions of the research on the types of institutions and M&A performance are as follows:(1)The other conditions remain unchanged,and the asset appraisal institution increases the company's performance of mergers and acquisitions;(2)Other conditions remain unchanged,and the asset appraisal report increases the company's the performance of mergers and acquisitions of listed companies;(3)Other conditions remain unchanged,and in mergers and acquisitions of the non-state-owned enterprise the asset appraisal institution increases the company's the performance of mergers and acquisitions of listed companies;(4)Other conditions remain unchanged,and in mergers and acquisitions of high tophold the asset appraisal institution increases the company's theperformance of mergers and acquisitions of listed companies;(5)Other conditions remain unchanged,and under the condition of high quality of accounting information the asset appraisal institution increases the company's the performance of mergers and acquisitions of the listed company.(6)Other conditions remain unchanged,in other industries with high market competition,the asset appraisal institution increases the listed company's level of the performance of mergers and acquisitions.(7)Other conditions remain unchanged,in low price synchronization the asset appraisal institution increases the listed company's level of the performance of mergers and acquisitions.The theoretical contributions of this paper are as follows: First,it enriches the research on M&A and revaluation theory.Through a comprehensive and systematic study of the valuation of mergers and acquisitions of listed companies in China,combined with the actual situation of China's capital market,comprehensive discussion,thereby it promotes the improvement of valuation theory.Second,the paper expands the research on the consequences of asset valuation.This paper studies the evaluation of institutional type of the company's investment scale,over-investment and mergers and acquisitions performance,and analysis of the mechanism.The paper examines the relationship between institutional types and investment scale,over-investment level and M&A performance based on the nature of property rights and information transparency.Third,it enriches the empirical evidence to evaluate the development of the industry.The type of evaluation agency is a new topic,and the influence of evaluation agency selection on listed companies only stays in the theoretical analysis level,and there is no relevant empirical evidence to support this research to make up for the lack of research.The practical significance of this paper is as follows: First,the study of this topic will give enlightenment to appraisal agencies.By comparing the impact of different appraisal agencies on the performance of listed companies,it will help appraisers to improve their appraisal strategies so as to serve M&A and restructuring businesses more effectively.It promotes the development of asset valuation industry.Second,it helps regulators to regulate.This paper studies the influence of the types of agencies on the scale of investment,over-investment and M&A performance in M&A and reorganization.A comprehensive review of this opinion will help to provide enlightenment to regulators and improve their work effectively.Thirdly,it has enlightenment to managers and investors in listed companies.In M&A and restructuring of listed companies,the impact of M&A andrevaluation agencies is on mergers and acquisitions,and managers pay more attention to the rationality of institutional choices to promote sound development of the company.For investors,the unreasonable assessment of institutional choices will have an impact on listed companies,enlightenment for the choice of investment in listed companies.The enlightenment of this article lies in that,firstly,to listed companies in our country,over-investment is the focus and hot-spot of financial management research.The article studies the influence of institutional choice on over-investment of listed companies in our country and analyzes the influence of state-owned property right on the relationship between institutional choice and over-investment.It is further found that the impact and mechanism of the assessment report on the scale of a company's investment improves the over-investment behavior of listed companies in M&A and restructuring activities and improve the company's investment efficiency.Second,for government departments over-investment harms enterprise value and hinder the normal operation of real economy and capital market.Studying the impact of valuation on over-investment of listed companies helps government departments to supervise the valuation behavior of M&A and restructuring of listed companies,and reduce the over-investment of listed companies and improve the efficiency of economic operation.Third,for rating agencies,as an independent "third party"in the M&A and restructuring activities,it provides a reasonable valuation report will help improve the performance of mergers and acquisitions of listed companies and maintain the reputation of the rating agencies.And strengthening self-regulation of valuation agencies' valuation judgment,which helps assess the healthy and stable development of the organization.Fourth,for further enhancing the quality of corporate accounting information disclosure,it prevents information asymmetry that caused the loss of efficiency in the valuation agencies.This study shows that information transparency is an important factor that affects the evaluation of institutional types and M&A performance,investment scale and over-investment.The quality of accounting information examines the relationship between the two in terms of the level of financial disclosure of listed companies,and this article also considers the relationship between the two in view of the information of the stock market.The synchronization of stock price reflects the influence of the company's private information on stock price fluctuations.The impact of the stock price synchronization on the assessment of institutional types and mergers and acquisitions performance,investment size andover-investment.This article also considers the impact of institutional type and M&A performance,investment size and over-investment from an industry perspective.The degree of competition in the market also reflects the degree of industry information disclosure from the perspective of the industry.This paper confirms that industry information disclosure is an important factor in assessing the relationship between institutional types and M&A performance,investment size and over-investment.Therefore,the impact of formal accounting information disclosure is on the relationship between institutional types and M&A performance,investment scale and over-investment from the perspective of financial information of listed companies,industry information and stock market information disclosure.Fifth,for strengthening the control of the controlling shareholders "hollowed out"behavior,and it avoids the loss of corporate assets.This study shows that controlling shareholders' behavior of "evacuating" assets of enterprises changes with the proportion of shares they hold.Controlling shareholders are more likely to "hollow out" listed companies when the proportion of large shareholders is low,while controlling shareholders are more likely to supervise managers' behaviors and reduce the "emptiness" of listed companies ".Therefore,the regulation of listed controlling shareholder's behavior is conducive to the long-term development of capital market and the formation of value investment.Sixth,for the nature of property rights.From the existing literature,the absence of owners of state-owned enterprises leads to excessive government intervention for their own interests.At the same time,state-owned enterprises and valuation agencies are inextricably linked in the restructuring of asset evaluation institutions.As a result,the valuation agencies suffered serious loss of neutrality when assets is state-owned.Therefore,the nature of property rights should be concerned by listed companies regulatory.The limitation of this article is that: first,this paper chooses the types of institutional agencies as research variables to examine the influence of M&A performance,investment scale and over-investment.It also examines the impact of property rights and information transparency on M&A performance,investment scale and over-investment level.Furthermore,it examines the relationship between the appraisal report and over-investment and M&A performance.The scale of investment,over-investment level and M&A performance do not fully summarize the economic behavior after M&A and restructuring.This research has some defects between the type of organization and theeconomic behavior of M&A.Second,using accounting information quality response information transparency is not comprehensive,and earnings management can also reflect the transparency of information.Third,the mount of the data does not reflect the trend after many years later.The future research direction of this paper is to evaluate the influence of agency selection on the passing rate of mergers and acquisitions.Asset valuation pricing has become the main basis for mergers and acquisitions and IPO pricing.In mergers and acquisitions audit,the Commission's review of the literature is mainly from two aspects.However,after the "related" company,the company's performance may be even worse.In M&A and reorganization audit,it is mainly discussed from the perspective of assessment methods,but it is not from the perspective of assessment report type.Assess the impact of institution selection is helpful for the rate of value added.Based on the research of accuracy,the difference between the current transaction price and the appraised value of the existing literature and the difference between appraised value and book value are discussed.The transaction price and the valuation value are called the valuation accuracy,and the valuation value and the book value are called the assessment value-added rate.The current study,asset valuation pricing has become the main basis for mergers and acquisitions and IPO pricing,and corporate governance is also an important factor affecting the valuation accuracy.Therefore,it makes sense to study the relationship between institutional selection and assessment accuracy. |
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