Study On Decision Model Of Enterprises In Emerging E-business Marketing Modes

In the past ten years,with the rapid development of cyberization and informatization in China’s market,online shopping has gradually become the mainstream way of consumers’ shopping,and e-commerce has gradually become one of the important motives to promote the sustained and powerful development of China’s economy.Under such a "investment opportunity" of the Internet,many traditional enterprises have switched to the Internet,and a large number of retailers have poured into the e-business platform.The Chinese market has undergone a profound transformation and innovation led by the trend of "Internet +".In this process,the competition between e-commerce platforms and enterprises is becoming increasingly fierce,the marketing potential of enterprises has been deeply tapped,the innovation ability has been released in all directions,and a variety of new marketing models have emerged in the market,showing a rich and colorful sales ecology.Some typical examples are that a large number of enterprises get profit from online comment marketing by click farming and praise cash-back;brand enterprises such as Uniqlo use BOPS(Buy Online and Pick Up in Store)marketing mode to achieve industry-leading competitive advantage;Pinduoduo use the social group-buying and group-buying-induced in which consumers use their social resources to share informations to be listed and make rapid progress.In these new marketing modes,there is a game of interest between platforms and enterprises.How do they make decisions? That is,how to determine various sales parameters such as price,cash back,number of participants and so on? What are the conditions for enterprises to adopt these new marketing models? The marketing of enterprises should not only enhance their short-term market demand and profits,but also contribute to the long-term sustainable development of enterprises.Do these latest e-commerce marketing modes promote the sustainable development of enterprises? All of these are important theoretical and practical issues which are worth pondering in the Internet era.To this end,this study chooses five typical emerging marketing modes of e-commerce in turn,i.e.click farming,praise cash-back,onmi-channel,social group buying and group-buying-induced.Through the construction of game theory andoperational research model,this dissertation analyses the implementation conditions and relevant decision-making rules of enterprises,and discusses their sustainable impact on the long-term systematic marketing of enterprises,so as to draw the management inspiration and suggestions.The work and results of this study are as follows:1.The evolutionary game law of click farming and platform supervision is analyzed by evolutionary game method.The influence of enterprise income of click farming,platform active supervision cost and social attention on click farming on enterprises’ decision-making and platform supervision is discussed based on the development law of e-commerce in China.We get some enlightenments as follows.(1)When all parties of society do not pay attention to click farming,the reputation and economic loss(revenue)of platform to carry out negative(active)supervision are not high,and there is no motive for platforms to publish regulatory information and utilize active supervision.At this time,the government and the third party should intervene in order to restrain the act of click farming by sharing the cost of prior supervision of the platform,increasing the attention of the society to click farming,and urging the platform to disclose information.(2)When all parties of society pay enough attention to click farming,the reputation and economic loss(income)of platform utilizing negative(active)supervision are higher than the cost of supervision.The platforms have the motivation to utilize active supervision strategy,disclose regulatory information,and improve the effectiveness of prior supervision to effectively suppress click farming.(3)When the gap of income and cost is very high or very low,the serious attention to click farming paid by all parties of society forces the platform to ineffective and active supervision,which results in the waste of social resources.(4)In order to effectively inhibit click farming,all parties in society should give priority to reducing the benefits of click farming,increasing the cost of click farming,promoting the effectiveness and intensity of the platform subsequent supervision,and broadening the channels of social reporting.While doing the above work well,it can also reduce the cost of supervision,improve social attention,and promote the effectiveness of prior supervision of the platform to assit.The cost of subsequent supervision and the reputation of subsequentsupervision are not the key factors of click farming supervision.2.Operational research optimization and KKT method are used to analyze the implementation conditions and decision-making rules of praise cash-back.The results show that:(1)praise cash-back increases the market share of the retailers in the second stage,but the consumers need to pay higher prices;(2)the cash-back of low-quality products is high and high-quality products need not cash-back to acquire good reviews,and only the retailers with medium-quality products can utilize it.Return of good reviews;(3)The profit of retailers increases first and then decreases with the improvement of product quality;(4)The bigger the negativity bias of reviews,the bigger the product quality space and the higher the cash-back,but the bigger the profit decline of retailers;(5)praise cash-back reduces the trust of consumers in online review system.Through the analysis of the marketing sustainability,it is found that praise cash-back is not conducive to their long-term development,and thus the management inspiration and countermeasures are obtained.3.Using game theory,this dissertation analyses the implementation conditions and decision-making rules of enterprise cooperation in realizing omni-channel BOPS,and finds that:(1)the optimal online price and wholesale price of dual-channel supply chain increase with the increase of offline flow income,while the optimal physical store price decreases with the increase of offline flow income;(2)when the revenue of offline flow and consumer’s BOPS preference are high enough,the BOPS channel demand will be positive,wholesale price is proportional to the revenue of offline flow,but sales price is inversely proportional to offline flow revenue;(3)the total profit of supply chain under MW contract is not lower than that under RW contract;(4)the revenue of offline flow,the cost of online flow,consumer’s BOPS preference and consumer’s channel loyalty have a major impact on BOPS cooperation between manufacturer and retailer.Through the analysis of marketing sustainability,it is found that the cooperation of BOPS is beneficial to the sustainable development of enterprises,from which management enlightenment and countermeasures can be obtained.4.This dissertation uses game theory to analyze the implementation conditionsand decision-making rules of social group buying,and finds that:(1)On the platform of social group buying,enterprises with low-quality commodities will not adopt group buying strategies(should not enter group buying platforms);the number of high-quality commodities will increase with commodity quality,and decrease with social acceptability.(2)On the social group buying platform,the profit of the platform and enterprise increases with the decrease of price elasticity of consumers,and increases with initial consumers and social acceptability.(3)Under the same conditions,the profits of high-quality enterprises in social group buying platforms are higher than those of traditional platforms;the profits of low-quality enterprises in the two platforms are the same(in fact,they do not adopt group buying strategies).(4)The commodity price of social group buying platform is lower than that of traditional platform.Through the analysis of marketing sustainability,it is found that there are two sides to the impact of social group buying on sustainable development of enterprises,from which management countermeasures are put forward.5.The implementation conditions and decision-making rules of group-buying-induced are analyzed by game theory.The results show that:(1)he platform should adopt the strategy of inducing group-buying only when the social acceptability of consumers,the push money and flow spillover effect of platform are high;(2)the strength of inducing such as the amount of inducing money,should increase with the increase of flow spillover and price elasticity,and decrease with the increase of social acceptability difficulty;the sale price determined by e-commerce companies and the number of customers participating in group-buying are higher when platform induces group-buying than those when platform doesn’t induce group-buying;(3)Platform and enterprise all obtain higher profits through group-buying-induced,but enterprises can obtain higher multiples of profits;(4)When platform adopts group-buying-induced,platform and enterprise profits increase with the push money;(5)Group-buying-induced can increase the initial consumer utility.The theoretical contribution and innovation of this dissertation lies in the construction of the basic theoretical models of the latest marketing models,which provides a framework and a new perspective for this kind of research.Firstly,the evolutionary game theory model of click farming and platform supervision is constructed.On the basis of investigation,the platform supervision strategy is analyzed from the perspective of active supervision and negative supervision.According to the realistic factors such as reputation and cost,the utility functions of click farming and platform supervision are depicted,which enriches the decision-making and management theory of click farming.Secondly,a theoretical decision-making model of enterprise based on praise cash-back is constructed.An online review model considering negative feedback preference,consumer’s trust in the evaluation system,positive feedback and negative feedback based on Bayesian belief revision principle is put forward.On the basis of this model,a decision-making model of praise cash-back is extended,which enriches the theory of online review and praise cash-back.Thirdly,the theoretical model of cooperation contract of enterprise based on BOPS is constructed,and the fixed compensation contract(MW contract and RW contract)of BOPS cooperation between two enterprises is proposed.The advantages and disadvantages of the two contracts and the influencing factors of contract realization are discussed based on game theory,which enriches the theory of BOPS.Fourthly,a theoretical decision-making model of enterprise based on social group buying and group-buying-induced is constructed.The utility theory is used to depict consumer’s choice behavior in social group buying.The social acceptability is introduced into the decision-making model of social group buying and group-buying-induced.The influence of social acceptability on group buying pricing and inducing cost is analyzed.This dissertation deepens our understanding of current phenomena and rules of social group buying,and perfects the theory of social group buying.In addition,the model depicts the flow spillover effect in group buying,the push money of platform and the amount of inducing mone,which enriches the decision-making theory of social group buying and group-buying-induced.From the point of view of practical significance,various new marketing modes have been widely used in China’s e-commerce industry,but there are also many unsolved problems.In this dissertation,through the construction of relevant decision-making model,these questions are answered and countermeasures areprovided.Specifically,it can help to solve the following practical problems:(1)how can the government and e-commerce platforms restrict and regulate the click farming of e-commerce enterprises;(2)the conditions and pricing rules for the implementation of praise cash-back;(3)the establishment of BOPS cooperation contracts;(4)how to improve the proportion of high-quality enterprises in social group buying platforms and the profit of enterprises utilizing social group buying;(5)the conditions and pricing rules for inducing group buying.