| In recent years,with the adjustment of China's economic structure and the change of pace in economic growth,the risks in the financial sector have continued to rise.As of the end of 2017,the balance of non-performing loans was 1.71 trillion yuan in Chinese deposit insurance institutions,and the non-performing loan ratio was 1.74%.The potential risk of insurance institutions increased,and if not handled properly,regional or even systemic financial risks may arise.On May 1,2015,the "Regulations on Deposit Insurance"(hereinafter as the "Regulations")was formally implemented.It supplemented the legal system with a key link in the market withdrawal system of problematic financial institutions.The "Regulations" set out the goal of establishing a deposit insurance system,and entrust the deposit insurance fund management institutions with the responsibilities of making and adjusting relevant charges,manage and use the funds,and take in-advance measures to rectify problems and handle risks.Since the initiation of the deposit insurance system,China has carried out some useful explorations and practices in the determination of premium,information collection,premium collection,etc.,ensuring that the deposit insurance system has started steadily,but early intervention and risk disposal have not been carried out.The risk of insurance institutions has grown.The root causes are mainly defects and deficiencies in the design of early correction and risk handling mechanisms.In order to do a good job of disposing the problematic insurance institutions and to fight against the financial risks,the deposit insurance system must be improved as soon as possible on the basis of the existing system.Based on this,this paper takes the mechanism construction of deposit insurance system prevention and disposal issues as the research object,using the research methods such an empirical analysis and normative analysis,induction and deduction,theory and practice,and compares and analyzes to expand the research.Through a comparative analysis of foreign deposit insurance system mechanisms in preventing and disposing the problematic insurance institutions,this article focuses on the following issues:What kind of roles should the deposit insurance system in China play in preventing and disposing of insurance institutions?What kind of role should be played and what kind of mechanism should be constructed in order to maximize the role of China's deposit insurance system in preventing and disposing of insurance institutions and improve the efficiency of disposal?This article starts from the researches backgrounds,purposes and significances(Chapter 1),as well as literature review and theoretical basis(Chapter 2),and builds the main line around the mechanism of prevention and disposal of deposit insurance institutions.On the basis of comparing and sorting out the insurance institutional framework for the prevention and disposal of deposit insurance system at home and abroad,the paper proposes that the process of preventing and disposing of deposit insurance system should be divided into three stages:pre-event,intra-event and post-event,respectively corresponding to the risk difference rate of the deposit insurance system mechanism,prompt correction mechanism and risk disposal mechanism,and conduct in-depth researches from the above three aspects(Chapter 3).By analyzing the theory of risk differential fee mechanism in deposit insurance system,a risk pricing differential option model for deposit insurance in China's large insurance institutions considering systematic risk overflow and debt liquidation structure is constructed to solve the problem of unreasonable pre-risk prevention of deposit insurance system in China(Chapter 4).Through the analysis of problematic insurance institutions recognition theory and international practice,a panel-ordered logistic regression model for predicting the risk changes of insurance institutions with medium and small problems is constructed to solve the problem of early identification of the problematic insurance institutions that are not timely.By reviewing the constructions and practices of prompt correction mechanisms in China,it is proposed that the deposit insurance system's prompt correction mechanism in China should be improved in four aspects:laws and regulations,regulatory parameters,trigger criteria,and corrective measures,so as to solve the problems of difficult intervention in China(Chapter 5).Through the analysis of the basic principles of the effective disposal of deposit insurance,and comparing the practices of insurance institutions at home and abroad in recent years,this paper pointed out the inadequacies of China's disposal mechanism,and proposed that China's deposit insurance risk disposal mechanism should be improved from both macro and micro perspectives.And the problems of no joint between or among the related regulations of deposit insurance system and post-event disposal difficult problems should be solved(Chapter 6).Finally,the author made a brief summary of the full text(Chapter 7).The innovation of this article lies in:This paper deeply analyzes the connotation of risk-taking in deposit insurance,and constructs an option pricing model that considers systemic risk spillovers,debt repayment structure,and deposit insurance payment limits of insurance institutions in large insurance institutions.Empirical analysis shows that the level of the insurance institution's premium is positively related to the size of its systemic risk spillover.The relationship between the two parties is non-linear.Ignoring systematic risk overflow may seriously underestimate the applicable premium of large-scale insurance institutions;the structure of insurance institution's debt repayment has a great impact on the deposit insurance premium rate,and the high-risk insurance institution's debt repayment structure is easier to affect deposit insurance premium.It is suggested that a differential risk premium mechanism for classified pricing should be established based on the systematic risk spillovers of insurance institutions.This paper takes the insolvency risk index as the explanatory variable,and uses the macro and micro indicators to construct the panel-ordered logistic regression model that predicts the state of risk changes of insurance institutions for the explained variables.It's found that the non-performing loan ratio has a significant negative impact,while GDP,capital adequacy ratio,Return on Assets and the leverage ratio have a positive effect.At the same time,the PSTAR model proves to be more objective and effective for forecasting risk changes of insurance institutions in the next year.Therefore,the deposit insurance fund management agency can use PSTAR model to predict the risk changes of insurance institutions.Judging from the effective implementation of the prompt correction mechanism of the deposit insurance system,the accurate identification of problem insurance institutions,as well as standardized legal authorization,scientific monitoring parameters,clear triggering criteria,and sound corrective measures are the keys to the effective functioning of the prompt correction action of the deposit insurance system.Therefore,we should improve the prompt correction mechanism of China's deposit insurance system from the aspects of legal authorization,regulatory parameters,triggering standard setting,and corrective measures.An independent deposit insurance institution,subject to legal authorization and disposing powers and tools,explicit triggering mechanisms,scientific disposal procedures,and market-oriented disposal methods are the core elements of the deposit insurance disposal platform.Therefore,we should improve the risk disposal mechanism of deposit insurance system in China by consolidating existing legal resources and establishing an independent deposit insurance company at a macro level as soon as possible,and clarify the disposal of the subject at the micro level,strengthen the disposal of power and tools,improve the trigger mechanism,refine the disposal process,and improve the disposal methods. |
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