Study On Operational Strategies In Low-carbon Supply Chains Considering Consumer Behavior

With the rapid development of economic,the increasing greenhouse gas emissions have caused a disastrous impact on our society and environment.With the serious deterioration of environment,global economics and commerce are developing in a low-carbon trend.To respond to series of protocols and frameworks proposed by the United Nations,many countries establish low-carbon policies,such as carbon tax,emission trade and carbon quotas.With the increase of government publicity and the emergence of carbon labels,an increasing number of consumers are giving consideration to products' low-carbon level,not just considering the price.As more and more environmental norms are enforced and consumers shift their purchase options towards the environmental friendly products,whether it is a better alternative for firms to acquire low-carbon technology is really a matter that should be critically studied.In addition,how to determine the price of low carbon products and the cooperation strategies become important issues for the supply chain members.Therefore,the research on operational strategies under low-carbon environment has important theoretical significance and application prospect.The paper analyzes a detailed model which incorporates cap-and-trade regulation,market competition environment and consumers' low-carbon preference.The model mainly analyzes firms' carbon emission reduction decisions,pricing decisions and cooperative strategies.The results can provide useful managerial insights for supply chain members.In addition,three components including economic,social and environmental utility are included when considering the impact of firms' behaviors on social welfare.The analysis on social welfare is important to provide some theoretical references for the government to formulate effective measures and appropriate low carbon policies.The main work and innovations of the dissertation are summarized as follows:(1)Under the low-carbon environment,we develop price and low-carbon competition models between one socially responsible manufacturer(RM)and one ordinary manufacturer(OM).We investigate the impact of consumers' low-carbon preference and competing environment on manufacturers' low-carbon behaviors.Our results show that when consumers are sensitive to the price only,both RM and OM will not reduce carbon emission even if they have the capability to choose.In addition,we observe that a manufacturer's price and self emission reduction rate are always strategic complements.Additionally,a manufacturer's price and his competitor's emission reduction rate are always strategic substitutes.Throughthe discussion,we find that even though it is always beneficial for OM to acquire the low-carbon technology,the benefit of doing so diminishes as the competition intensifies.(2)Under the background of implementing low-carbon policies,we investigate how manufacturers' low-carbon behaviors are affected by factors such as consumers' low-carbon preference,the cap-and-trade regulation and competing environment.Under cap-and-trade regulation,even if consumers do not have low-carbon preference,both RM and OM will reduce carbon emissions.It explains that the implementation of the cap-and-trade regulation is effective to restrict manufacturers' emission behaviors.Under cap-and-trade regulation,it is still a rational choice for OM to acquire low carbon technology.However,OM's participation in low-carbon production is not always beneficial to the social welfare.Under a small carbon quota,OM's participation in low-carbon production will produce adverse effect on social welfare.Thus,for the policy-maker,it is important to set the carbon quota in an effective range.(3)Considering a two-echelon supply chain consists of one manufacturer and one retailer,we focus on the emission reduction strategies for the chain members using the Manufacturer-Stackelberg game model.Two emission reduction strategies are compared,including single manufacturer's emission reduction in production strategy and joint emission reduction strategy,of which entails manufacturer's and retailer's emission reduction.The results show that the joint emission reduction strategy can motivate manufacturer to improve emission reduction rate,so as to achieve the purpose of protecting the ecological environment.It can be concluded that the joint emission reduction strategy is more profitable for both the manufacturer and the retailer.When considering consumers' low-carbon preference,the retailer always has motivation to implement low-carbon promotion though without the manufacturer's incentives.In addition,a high carbon price cannot always motivate enterprises to reduce emission reduction and promote the cooperation of supply chain enterprises.Therefore,it is necessary for the government to control carbon prices within a reasonable range,so as to motivate retailers to provide low carbon promotion and promote the sustainable development of supply chain.(4)Considering the Retailer-Stackelberg game model,we investigate the cooperative emission reduction issues in the supply chain.The impact of different supply chain structures on firms' decisions and profits are also considered.Under Retailer-Stackelberg game,the supply chain can obtain higher profit under the joint emission reduction strategy than that under the single emission reduction strategy.The joint emission reduction strategy is still a rational choice for the supply chain members.Under single emission reduction strategy,theprofit of the manufacturer when he is a follower is not always lower than that when he is a leader.Both the profits of the retailer and the whole supply chain are higher under Retailer-Stackelberg game than that under Manufacturer-Stackelberg game.Under joint emission reduction strategy,the profit of the manufacturer/retailer when he is a leader is always higher than that when he is a follower.The profit of the supply chain under Retailer-Stackelberg game may lower than that under Manufacturer-Stackelberg game.When consumers' low carbon preference is low,the profit of the supply chain is higher under Manufacturer-Stackelberg game.The above research results not only enrich the theory of operational strategies in low-carbon supply chains,but also provide important theoretical reference for the government to implement low-carbon policy and provide more scientific evidence for the supply chain members to optimize their decisions.