| Merging shell resources,a special but integral part of mergers in Chinese capital market,is derived from the system of listing companies in accordance with the general rule of "total control with limited units".Under specific control in China,shell resource mergers are subject to the government's intervention all the way through.Therefore,it is of great significance and value to do research on the effect of the government's intervention on the mergers.However,the existent literature on the field has only focused on the effect of the government's intervention on the achievement of mergers,but failed to reveal its social effect or the intervention effect when done by governments at different levels.Consequently,a new research perspective of multilevel government intervention is at first proposed in this dissertation,and based on the distinctive motives the government at each level has to intervene,a comprehensive framework for research is established to describe the interventions and differences in performance when multilevel governments get involved.Then,the samples of 351 businesses are studied in terms of difference in differences model(DID)on panel data,logistics and multiple regression,and the relevant hypothesis are checked and verified.The dissertation not only reveals the performance effects resulting from government's intervention out of different motives,thus improving the theory of government ultimate property rights,but also provides theoretical guidance for the government to intervene in shell resource mergers.The innovations and conclusions of the dissertation is as follows:(1)A new perspective for research is raised with regards to the performance effect resulting from multi-level governments' intervention out of different motives,amending the theory of government ultimate property rights.Currently,inadequate attention has been academically paid to the behavioral objective variation for governments at different levels to intervene in the mergers.And the judgement of the intervention performance effect is not accurate nor objective when it is done only on the private interest motivation which is included in the theory of government ultimate property rights.In this dissertation,an objective function for governments at different levels are constructed,which is an amendment to the government ultimate property rights theory,based on the government regulation theory with such typical characteristics considered as the reformation of government fiscal decentralization in the China's transitional economy,the local government protectionism,and so on.The result suggests that the government at a higher level like the central government is more of public benefit,but the lower government more of private benefit.It can be logically deduced that a government which has the right to regulation deserves the ultimate control even at the ultimate level.Thus,with the analysis of governments'foundation and motives done when intervening in shell resource mergers,a new perspective for research is proposed that the objective variations for governments at different levels to intervene should be taken into account,enriching the "grabbing hand" theory.(2)An overall theory framework on performance test is constructed for government's intervention in shell resources mergers.The past research is insufficient to deal with how government's intervention works on the performance effect of mergers,and lack of an overall theory frame.Accordingly,the dissertation starts with the government's motives for intervention,observing the model of"government control(motive)---merger pattern(behavior)---merger performance(result)";and based on the revised government ultimate control theory,a dual channel model,a two-level government intervention with its motive,behavior and performance,is constructed,that is,a government at a different level intervenes in a different pattern and produces a different result.In this method,how governments at different levels can influence shell resource merging is clarified,and their motives,behaviors and performances get related with one another.Hence,a relatively complete framework of government's intervention is established,well showing the internal mechanism by which government intervenes shell resource merging.(3)The choice of mergers and acquisitions under different levels of government intervention is studied.Logistic regression analysis is used to study the way of government intervention and resource acquisition based on different motivations.In the shell resource transaction,the two levels of government intervention motives are different,resulting in differences in their intervention methods,both financial subsidies,loan guarantees and other financial support,as well as other policy support such as factor investment,resource allocation and government policy;Localized M&A,Cross-border M&A,multiple M&A and other interventions,thus form the corresponding different model of M&A.Empirical test shows that local government-controlled listed companies adopted more local M&A and diversified M&A model,foreign M&A is used more in the central government control and non-government control of shell resources M&A,localization characteristics are not obvious.The direct intervention of the administrative coordination mode and the intervening mode of the localized or non-localized,diversified or homogeneous model have become the intermediate variable between the government intervention motive and the intervention performance,which confirm the path of "ultimate control of the government-government intervention motivation-direct intervention mode and M&A model".(4)The micro-performance of the enterprises involved in mergers with government's intervention is studied and appraised.On the basis of the stakeholder theory,together with the typical features of shell resource mergers,influences on stakeholders are studied which the major stakeholders and the government's motives and behaviors have when the event occurs,while the past studies failed to include the features of merger and gave priority only to the shareholders' interest.In terms of theory,a new model of the influence of government's intervention on mergers is proposed and empirically tested in DID.From the stakeholders' view,the government's intervention has an effect not only on the performance of shareholders on either side,but also on the performance of the debtors,staff and other stakeholders;and their performances are also subject to the mode that government gets in.The dissertation is the first one that appraises the performance of the acquirer's shareholders,debtors and other stakeholders,which is a breakthrough and also an extension of the past research focusing only the shareholders' interest.(5)The social macro-performance of the enterprises involved in mergers with government's intervention is studied and appraised.With the theory of M&A promoting economy,an analysis is made on how the government's intervention motives and behaviors influence economic growth and employment;considering not only the shareholders' interest,as the past research did,but also the others',a new model in which government's intervention influences social performance is proposed as a theory and empirically tested.From the view of social performance,the effect that the government produces while intervening shell resource mergers covers not only the enterprise performance,but also the social welfare and is subject to the mode the government gets in.The dissertation is the first one that appraises the social effect in terms of taxation and employment,which is also a breakthrough and an extension of the past research focusing only the shareholders' interest.Besides,this verifies and develops the theory of "grabbing hand" and that of "helping hand."... |
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