Several New Financing Instruments And The Investing And Financing Selection Of SMEs

As the economy of our country has entered a new normal state,the rate of economic growth has shifted from rapid growth to medium-rapid growth.This economic restructuring task has determined that our country is facing greater downward economic pressure.We need to make "popular entrepreneurship and mass innovation" as a new engine,so that continuously entrepreneurial activities and new enterprises will bring sustained vitality to the growth of economic.Then these engines become the core power of economic growth under this new normal.However,we have noticed that the enterprises in china are faced with serious financing problems in the new economic period.Solving the financing problems of small and medium-sized entities through these innovation tools,we can analyze the dynamic behavior of enterprises and their characteristics.Also the investment and the scale are the focuses of this paper.Based on the above guidelines,this dissertation establishes several mathematical and financial models in line with the laws of economics.Considering the outer financing channels(the guarantee way and innovation tools)and the competitive wage design,we derive the dynamic behavior of the real firm and its investment also with the scale.Considering the information asymmetry between the loan and the investor,the signaling theory helps us to solve the firm's behavior in different environment and information exposure.The firm's scale can be used as an effective signal to convey related information.The specific content of this article is divided into the following aspects:The first chapter considers the choice of investment and financing for entities based on several innovative financing tools.Taking the investor's preference for risk into account in the market,several innovation financing tools such as the performance-sensitive debt,asset securitization way and venture capital funds are discussed in this chapter.In this part,we consider the investment and financing preference also with the firm's scale.Besides,the regulatory and some values are given in this part.Several conclusions are derived in this chapter: First,companies with higher borrowing requirements would prefer performance-sensitive debt as a financing tool,and higher performance-sensitive factors could increase the equity value of companies and reduce the value and leverage of creditors by increasing thecorrelation between coupon interest and performance.For the disposal of major asset allocations,we have introduced asset securitization as a financing tool to study the issuer's optimal risk retention strategy and the related regulatory system mechanism.The result shows that the optimal risk retention of the company is positively related to the risk aversion attitude of the issuer.The ratio of risk retention depends on the distribution of the asset default loss rate of the asset pool.The regulator should be cautious about the macro-prudential risk.For the companies who grow fast,the venture capital funds are often used to help the firm to grow bigger.High-profitability and low-risk volatility will lead to higher value and increase the investment levels of venture capital funds.It can be found that the higher risk volatility will weaken the marginal value of the fund.The marginal value of the funds are more sensitive for the lower profitability when they are near the close deadline.Second,we consider the characteristics of real firm and scale under the credit guarantee mechanism which is more favored by start-up companies.Two common innovative financing instruments—equity-for-guarantee swap(EGS)and mixed guarantees are selected in the credit guarantee system.This chapter studies the dynamic analysis and investment of the SMEs.By studying the optimal investment and the dynamics of companies,the corresponding established derivatives and the fair guarantee cost are calculated in these two credit guarantee framework.By building the framework of the firm's scale,we also derive the impact among the guarantee cost,the scale and the operation of the firm.The conclusion shows that the guarantee cost and enterprise scale are closely related to the production and operation situation.Seeking for more profits will drive entrepreneurs to pursue higher risks.In the hybrid guarantee mode,the relation between the capital stock and growth rate are positive related,and the relation between the fixed guarantee fees and volatility are reversed.For this financing way,the “debt conservation” is still established.The share of equity that companies need to pay has a complementary effect with the fixed guarantee fees.Third,most of the assumptions in the previous paragraph are made in the symmetric information.However,there is often information asymmetry between the borrower(enterprise)and the lender in the credit market.The main reason for this phenomenon is that the enterprise has information advantages over the lender.The information asymmetry is the main reason of credit mismatch in the financial market.It is assumed that real enterprises adopt EGS to obtain external financing.This chapter attempts to reveal the dynamic investment decisions of enterprises under theasymmetric information.By analyzing the Nash equilibrium between the borrower and the guarantee company,the pricing of all derivatives are given in the symmetric information and asymmetric information.In the symmetric information,a good company can enter the market with a smaller initial capital than a bad company.The guarantee cost is lower,and the amount of investment,equity value,and market entry value are greater for the good firm.The existence of information asymmetry weakens the value of good companies.The enterprise will increase the amount of investment to resist the influence of information asymmetry.In the separation equilibrium,good companies convey their good productivity signals through a much smaller initial capital,while in the pooling equilibrium,the initial capital amount lies between the amount of initial capital of good and bad companies under the symmetric information.The research results can help guarantee companies to formulate guarantee cost rules and provide a theoretical and practical guidance for SMEs entering the market to choose signal games.Fourth,with the development of the real enterprises,it is needed to hire the outstanding managers to run their businesses.Then there comes a problem of the proxy conflicts between the managers and shareholders.In this chapter,we mainly design the compensation incentives to motivate managers to work diligently.Supposing that SMEs obtain credit loans through EGS,we study the impact of the incentive of the compensation on the managers' investment decisions and their risk transfer motives.This chapter discusses the results from the two dimensions of corporate external financing environment(guarantee swap equity)and internal governance structure(manager incentive incentives).The results of the study show that salary incentives will increase the investment ratio,but companies need to pay higher guarantee cost at the same time.The short-term incentives and long-term incentives for compensation can offset the risk transfer incentives of senior executives.Therefore,an effective compensation scheme should include two parts:fixed salary and the incentive salary to decrease the agency conflict between executives and corporate shareholders.The result can help the SMEs to build a proper compensation scheme and promote the innovation of the manager.Also the result provides a direction for evaluating the firm and the behavior of the investment?...