Research On Production And Pricing Decision Of Closed-loop Supply Chain

An increasing number of countries and institutions are aware of the significance of environmental protection.The research of closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)has attracted considerable attention in academic and business fields since its important role in protecting the environment.CLSC takes the maximization of the product’s life cycle as its main goal,which is a closed process involving production,consumption and remanufacturing.It is a social issue related to the government,enterprises and consumers.As the subject of macro-control,the government plays an important role in guiding and regulating the development of enterprises.The subsidy mechanism can not only stimulate enterprises to carry out recycling and remanufacturing,but also alleviate a shortage of funds in operations.For these reasons,this dissertation extends the structure of the supply chain from single chain to two chains’ competition.In addition,the research contents are constantly deepened.This dissertation considers the impact of subsidy mechanism,subsidy modes and the shortage of funds in actural operations on production and pricing decisions of CLSC.The main works and conclusions can be summarized as follows.Chapter 3 draws attention to how decision states and the difference of production cost between new products and remanufactured products impact subsidy mechnism and supply chain member’s pricing decision.Chapter 3 considers a two-echelon supply chain with a remanufacturer and a recycler.Under centralized and decentralized situations,Chapter 3 proposes four models and attempts to figure out suitable conditions and necessity of implementing subsidy mechnism.Results show that implementing subsidy mechanism could be beneficial to the return rate of used products in a limited range,while the flexibility of the optional range is greater in the centralized situation than that in the decentralized case.The implementation effect of the mechanism is closely related to the degree of difference of production cost.When producing remanufactured products is costly,implementing mechanism can increase the retail price and decrease the profit of whole supply chain and its members.Therefore,from the perspective of consumers and the members of the supply chain,it is not a wise choice to advocate this mechanism.However,the remanufacturer,as a leader in Stackelberg game,plays an important role in protecting the environment.Therefore,with government subsidy,the remanufacturer will increase the wholesale price of remanufacturing parts to motivate the recycler’s collecting enthusiasam.Besides,when the cost difference is slight or producing new products is more expensive,decision can be made based on the return rate of used products.Secondly,from the perspective of the enterprise and the society,Chapter 4 studies the optimal mode selection of government subsidy and production decision under different modes.Chapter 4 builds three subsidy models: the model of subsidizing the green product and its buyers(SG model),the model of subsidizing the remanufacturing product and its buyers(SR model)and the model of subsiding two products and their consumers(SGR model).There are some interesting findings.In the enterprise’s opinion,SGR model is not the optimal mode,while SG model can maximize the firm’s profit.With the goal of maximizing social benefit,the choice of government subsidy has a close relationship with production cost of green products.Thirdly,Chapter 5 considers pricing decision and the coordination and optimization of CLSC with capital constraint,while there is no government subsidy mechanism.This chapter designs a two-echelon CLSC with a remanufacturer and a capital constrained retailer.Based on decentralized and centralized decision-making modes,this chapter builds four models and then,obtains the optimal return price,wholesale price of used products and retailing price of new and remanufactured products.This chapter explores the suitable range of delay payment and external financing strategy from different perspectives.Then,a revenue sharing contract is designed to coordinate decentralized model and the pareto zone is found out.In addition,this chapter studies the effects of the proportion of revenue sharing,the coefficient of price sensitivity and the original scale of recycling market on different variables.Lastly,on the basis of competition between forward supply chain and CLSC,Chapter 6 studies supply chains’ optimal decision under different competition modes.Supposing each supply chain includes a retailer and a stable supplier,this chapter designs four competing structures: centralized competition model,two kinds of hybrid competition models,decentralized competition model.Based on these models,this chapter explores competition intensity between two chains and return rate on pricing,profits and decision-making.The increasing of return rate can benefit consumers and CLSC,while competition intensity between the two supply chains can increase both chains’ profits.However,the fiercer the competition will increase retail price and hurt consumers.Also,this chapter comes to a conclusion that one chain’s decision can affect the other.This study aims to enrich a growing body of knowledge relating to the management of CLSC and provide some guidance of operation for firms and decision basis for the government.