Entrepreneurial Sponsorship,Belief Change,and Innovation Decision

Entrepreneurial policy advocates and facilitates people to become entrepreneurs.As the low-ability individuals are more sensitive to entrepreneurship subsidies or the facilitation of market entry,entrepreneurial policy usually drives downs the market players' belief toward a new entrant's or an entrepreneur's ability.A mode as“Government?Belief?Others?Entrepreneur”runs through the analysis of this dissertation:The government entrepreneurial policy drives down the market players'belief toward a new entrant's abiiity,and the belief change(i.e.,belief decline)affects the others'(e.g.,the incumbent,the investor)reaction functions which might eventually change the entrepreneur's innovation decision.The first model is a sequential innovation game with two high-ability entrepreneurs(a leader and a follower).Belief decline might bring about strategic selection effect or strategic implementation effect.The leader always pursues the high-level innovation strategy,and the belief decline decreases the leader 's innovation level(i.e.,strategic implementation effect).The follower should make a choice between the higher-level innovation strategy and the lower-level innovation strategy.Belief decline might affect the follower's strategic selection(e.g.,lower-level innovation strategy?higher-level innovation strategy),or just influence the follower's strategic implementation.The second model is a sales contest between an entrepreneur and a monopolistic incumbent.When an entrepreneur aims to "steal" customers from the incumbent,the incumbent would response with price reduction but selectively.If the belief is at a low level,no response;if at a high level,price reduction.Without response from the incumbent,belief decline reduces waiting customers,which depresses the entrepreneur's innovation.With response from the incumbent,belief decline reduces the incumbent's price reduction,which increases the innovation level instead.The third model is an innovation-imitation game between an entrepreneur and an incumbent(a potential imitator).If the original belief is at a low level,the entrepreneur usually favors complete deterrence strategy;while at a high level,the entrepreneur favors partial deterrence strategy.As the belief goes down,it becomes easier for the entrepreneur to deter the imitation.Belief decline might motivate the entrepreneur to select a more aggressive deterrence strategy(e.g.,partial deterrence strategy?complete deterrence strategy)which increases innovation level dramatically,or just facilitate the entrepreneur's strategic implementation(i.e.,decreasing the innovation level).The entrepreneurial policy might affect,via belief change,the entrepreneur's innovation strategy selection or innovation strategy implementation.This work would inspire researchers,policymakers,and entrepreneurs to analyze the entrepreneurial policy's strategic selection effect and strategic implementation effect from a belief change angle.