Research On Impact Mechanism And Empirical Analysis Of Chinese Listed Companies Ownership Characteristics To Innovation Behavior

In the past thirty years,China’s economy has achieved rapid development of long-term sustainability,and economic output jumped to second in the world,but the fact that the quality of economic development has been unable to keep up with the total amount of economic growth is troubling.As a latecomer country,China has been trying to accelerate the pace of technological progress,trying to explore an effective way to substitute labor elements and capital elements with the technical elements.Especially with the gradual disappearance of the demographic dividend,bonus systems and resource bonuses,engines of economic growth are declining,and promoting economic development mode from the "factor-driven" to"innovation-driven" change is an irreversible trend.Forming a national innovation capability of enterprises is affected by many internal and external factors,and both in theory and practice it has shown that corporate equity characteristic is one of the important internal factors to determine the level of innovation capability.Based on the facts of the typical characteristics,this paper studies the impact of equity characteristics on China’s listed companies’ innovative behavior.Firstly,this paper combs the characteristics of China’s listed companies and the status quo of their innovation.The different characteristics mean the difference of equity control of the company,which will further affect the behavior of business innovation through internal mechanisms and external mechanisms,internal mechanisms including dominance and equity incentives,external mechanisms including venture capital holdings and institutional investors holdings.In terms of internal mechanisms,combining with the existing literature,this paper combs mechanisms of the "dominance",managerial ownership affecting corporate R&D investment systematically,and then put forward the hypothesis.Regression results based on the least squares method show that both in state-owned enterprises or in the private sector,"dominance" did not directly effect innovation efforts,and managers had a stake in improving enterprise R&D intensity.From the indirect effects of view,only state-owned enterprises "dominance" will inspire managers indirectly to promote research and development expenses.From results of quantile regression,in state-owned enterprises and private enterprises,"dominance"has significant indirect positive marginal effect on low-quantile sites for business R&D intensity,but with the development of risk increases,effect of the dominance’indirect promotion to research and innovation becomes insignificant.SOE managers holdings have higher marginal positive effect on R&D intensity in high quantile sites than in low quantile sites.And private sector managers holdings have higher positive marginal effect on the R&D intensity with the intensity of research and development quantle sites improving in certain percentile range,but in high quantile,the marginal effect may turn to be negative.In the framework of the contract and economics,this paper builds a mathematical model about how equity incentive impacting on corporate innovation behavior,and then treats 153 listed companies in 2010-2011 implementing equity incentive as the "experimental group",treating year 2012 as window period to test the effect of the "experiment",using propensity score matching method to estimate the average treatment effect of equity incentive.The results show that the average treatment effect of stock options incentive to promote research and innovation is significantly greater than zero,the average treatment effect of restricted stock incentive to promote research and innovation is not significant.This means that from the perspective of technological innovation,the stock option incentive is more effective in our country.In terms of external mechanism,this paper reviews the mechanisms of impact of corporate venture capital holdings on innovative behavior containing meeting the needs of venture financing,superior investment strategy and technology counseling.Then we use the GEM IPO enterprise data for relevant empirical research,and the results showed that:the average treatment effect of venture capital holdings significantly is greater than zero,according to the nearest neighbor matching method,compared with companies with no VC involved,venture capital holdings significantly promote R&D strength of the companies.Non-arbitrage type of venture c.apital could significantly promote innovation,but there is no significant effect for arbitrage-based venture capital holdings on corporate innovation.Then this paper establishes a game model of manager interacting with institutional investors,and analyze the threshold effect of impact of institutional ownership on R&D investment,finally use data of listed companies from 2008 to 2012 to do the empirical research.The empirical results show that the presence of institutional investors on the impact of the company’s R&D spending exsits significant threshold effect.This is different from a simple linear relationship revealed by "short-sighted" theory,"neutral theory" and "smart theory" about institutional investors in the past.Unconditional quantile regression results show that there is a big heterogeneity between institutional investors.