Strategies Of Targeted Advertising Affected By Consumer Behavior In E-business

There is a modern marketing concept that all marketing strategies achieve their purposes only when they fully consider the characteristics of consumer behavior.As audience of advertising,the consumers' purchase decisions determine the effectiveness of advertising.Targeted advertising must coincide with consumer behavioral characteristics and psychological preference.Consumers are no longer simple information recipients when they are targeted under e-commerce environment.How to use targeted advertising strategies based on consumer behavior efficiently has become one of the important issues for firms and media operators.In order to provide effective management theories and method support for the efficient use of targeted advertising technology to relevant firms and media platforms,we deeply study targeted advertising strategies,combining consumer online shopping behavior,anti-targeted advertising behavior,privacy information disclosure and protection behavior in e-commerce.Firstly,we study firms' targeted advertising strategies and price competition based on consumers' online shopping preference.The results show that,firms' implement of targeted advertising strategies enhances their ability to control the market,increases wholesale price and retailer price of the product.Compared to mass advertising,only when the number of consumers with online shopping preference or the degree of consumer heterogeneity preference exceeds a threshold,the implement of targeted advertising increases entire channel profits.Meanwhile,considering consumer perceptions of online and offline shopping,we study firms' targeted advertising strategies and shopping channel selection with the influence of consumers' shopping channel selection behavior.We find that,the implement of the strategy of combining targeted advertising and targeted price increases firms' revenue;and that the degree of consumers' acceptance of the online channel is an important factor to influence the advertising strategy and choice of channel mode.Secondly,we study the media platforms' targeted advertising strategies based on consumers' ad-avoidance in the asymmetric “free VS chargeable” platform competition.With two-side market theory,the media platforms are divided into a free media platform and a chargeable media platform according to whether the platform charges the consumers or not.The findings show that in equilibrium that the free media platform's profit are increasing with ads-avoidance probability,while the equilibrium subscription fees on the chargeable media platform and the equilibrium ads price on the free media platform are decreasing monotonically with ads-avoidance probability.Consumers would rather suffer more ads-interference for the free service than pay for no-ad service.Furthermore,we research platform's targeted advertising strategies with consumers' ad-avoidance and information concealment in the symmetric “free VS free” platform competition.When the consumers choose to block targeted advertising and advertisers are multi-homing,the possibility that consumers block the targeted adverting increases the media platform's profit and decreases advertising price in equilibrium.When the network externality with which advertiser benefits from interacting with consumers is large than the network externality with which consumers benefit from interacting with advertiser,the maximum social welfare when consumers conceal their information is less than the maximum social welfare when consumers block targeted advertising.Thirdly,we study the persuasive mass advertising strategies when firms can't segment the consumers based on the disclosure of consumers' privacy information.We find that,when two competitive firms in the market simultaneously deliver persuasive advertisings that enhance the consumers' willingness to pay and increase the product demand,the firm that owns consumers' privacy information exclusively will gain higher profit.When two competitive firms in the market simultaneously deliver persuasive advertisings that increase consumer perception of product differentiation and mitigate market competition,the firm that owns consumers' privacy information exclusively may not get higher profit with persuasive advertising and personalized pricing strategies.Two competitive firms are easily prone to “prisoner's dilemma” in the decision-making process of whether they need to obtain consumer privacy information.Finally,we study the impact of consumer privacy protection on the targeted advertising strategies in the symmetric “free VS free” platform competition.Our conclusion indicates that in equilibrium,when advertisers are multi-homing,the marginal effect of media platform's targeted advertising integrating degree on advertising price,advertising volume and profit is higher(lower)than the rival's marginal effect of such factors,consumer privacy protection negatively(positively)affects media platform's advertising price,advertising volume and profit.Moreover,we study the impact of consumer privacy protection on the targeted advertising strategies in the asymmetric “free VS chargeable” platform competition.The result shows that in equilibrium the free-platform's advertising volume and profit are changing with the degree of consumer privacy protection,the trend of the changing is correlated with the improved content quality in paid-media platform.When the content quality in paid-media platform is less improved,consumer privacy protection will decrease the free-platform's equilibrium advertising volume and profit.When the content quality in paid-media platform is improved greatly,the equilibrium advertising volume and profit of the free-media platform reduce first and then increase with consumer privacy protection.