Research On Local Government Cooperation In Environmental Governance Across Administrative Regions

At present,China is in the midst of economic and social transformation,and the high mobility of resources is its main feature.This has led to more and more public problems that have evolved into national and global public issues across the boundaries of departments,governments and even regions.Among many cross-domain public issues,cross-administrative environmental issues have received more and more attention because of their wide range of influence and high awareness of public risk.In the more developed urban agglomerations such as Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei,Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta,environmental pollution across administrative regions is increasingly obvious and spreading,which has severely constrained the sustainable development of China’s regional economic society.At present,both in the academic level and in the practice reform process,consensus has been reached on cross-administrative environmental governance: breaking the localized governance model and moving towards cooperative governance.As far as the main body of cooperation is concerned,although the social forces have become more and more involved in the governance of cross-border public issues,the publicity and externality of the environment determine that social forces can only play an auxiliary rather than a dominant role,and the government is the dominant The governance structure will not change in the short term;while the central government and the common superior government can directly manage the authority,the cost is high.Therefore,local government cooperation is still the main countermeasure for cross-border public issues.In the study of environmental cooperation governance across administrative regions,there are not many studies involving interest issues.Interest relations are the most essential issues in the relationship between local governments.The root cause of local government cooperation in cross-administrative environmental governance lies in horizontal interest conflicts and dilemmas.The key is the coordination of horizontal interests.What are the horizontal interest contradictions in cross-administrative environmental cooperation governance? How do these conflicts of interest unfold and lead to the dilemma of local government cooperation? How to achieve local government cooperation in environmental governance across administrative regions through horizontal interest coordination? This paper explores the above issues based on the perspective of interests.Local government cooperation in environmental governance across administrative regions is a dynamic process.As a cooperative subject,the local government is in a complex interest relationship.From the perspective of local interests,as a contradictory unity of economic rationality and public rationality,the local government is a combination of local public interests and local government organizational interests;from the outside,the local The government is under the constraint of the central government relationship;the internal and external interest relations define the behavior logic of the local government from the micro and the macro,and the local government’s cross-administrative environmental cooperation behavior must be the product of this complex interest relationship.The demand for cooperation is the logical starting point for environmental cooperation among local governments in the administrative region.The generation depends on three aspects: First,the matching of resources and factors defines the scope of environmental cooperation.Second,the local government ’ s perception of common interests has spawned environmental cooperation.Willingness;in the end,the cost-benefit expectations for cooperation will lead to local government environmental cooperation actions.However,only the cooperation needs are not enough to generate cooperative actions,and the effectiveness and stability of cooperative actions cannot be guaranteed.The cooperation behavior of a single local government depends on its strategic choices.The strategic choices made by local governments based on the consideration of cost-benefit interests are likely to lead to the emergence of cooperation dilemmas,which are often manifested in difficulties in achieving cooperation,difficulty in implementing agreements,and difficulties in implementation supervision.From the perspective of game theory,local governments do not know the “cooperation” or“betrayal” strategies of other local governments.For the sake of their own interests,their dominant strategy must be “betrayal”.Internal mechanism.The choice of local government "betrayal" strategy has deep incentives.The flow obstruction of local government’s environmental governance resources caused by administrative district administration is the institutional premise of cooperation dilemma.Interest contradictions and conflicts are the internal roots of their choice of "betrayal" strategy.Specifically: regional interests and local interests,local interests and local government internal interests constitute a complex interest relationship,interest conflicts are the concentrated expression of interest relations;regional interests and local interests are mainly manifested in administrative economic development Contradictions with regional environmental protection;the contradiction between local interests is reflected in the competition among local governments under the pressure system;the contradictions among the internal interests of local governments are mainly manifested in the personal interests of local officials,the interests of departments and the interests of local governments and regional interests".In order to resolve the dilemma of cooperation and achieve local government cooperation in environmental governance across administrative regions,it is necessary to coordinate the interests of horizontal and local.To this end,we first need to build a horizontal benefit coordination platform.Cooperative organizations are platforms for horizontal interest coordination among local governments.According to the degree of institutionalization,cooperative organizations are divided into formal organizations and informal organizations.The selection criteria for local government cooperation organizations are the maximization of net income,that is,cooperation risks and transaction costs.Minimize,maximize the benefits of cooperation.Due to the complicated environmental problems in cross-administrative areas,the high risk of cooperation,and the high degree of institutional requirements for cooperative organizations,the establishment of local government cooperation organizations in cross-administrative environmental governance cannot be separated from the involvement of the central government;secondly,the horizontal benefits are formulated.The principle of coordination,that is,the rules of cooperation.The rules of cooperation are related to the problem of how the cooperation costs are distributed across the administrative environment.The heterogeneity between local governments determines their differentiated cost-sharing ability,which in turn creates a strong actor,which can play a leading role in cooperation cost sharing..The general principle of the formulation of cooperation rules is “common but differentiated responsibilities”.The former requires all members of the region to assume environmental responsibility responsibilities fairly,while the latter refines and limits the sharing of responsibilities among members.Among them,strong actors are Cross-administrative zone environmental cooperation governance should play a leading role,and corresponding compensation should be made to vulnerable areas in horizontal ecological compensation.Finally,we must optimize the horizontal benefit coordination path.The improvement of the cooperation mechanism is the key to optimizing the coordination path of horizontal interests,including the improvement of the negotiation mechanism,the improvement of the implementation mechanism and the improvement of the supervision mechanism.In terms of the negotiation mechanism,it mainly starts from the establishment of the negotiation and negotiation institutions,the establishment of a diversified negotiation body and the negotiation agreement with strong design implementation.The soundness of the implementation mechanism is inseparable from the effective implementation of the organizational system and the implementation of the evaluation system.The improvement of supervision mechanism needs to establish a diversified supervision body,improve the implementation of information disclosure system and establish an accountability mechanism for officials.Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei air pollution and its governance are very typical in the research of cooperative governance.Around this case,the author has studied from the following aspects: From the perspective of the composition of the cooperation subject,the author mainly focuses on the three provinces of Beijing,Tianjin and Hebei.Horizontal cooperation of local governments at the level of research.The air pollution cooperative governance behavior of the local governments as the main body of cooperation is a trade-off and consideration under the multi-interest relationship;from the perspective of cooperation demand,the seriousness of air pollution in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei and the inapplicability of the existing governance model are local government cooperation.The objective conditions of demand.The externalities of air pollution and its governance have prompted the local governments of the three places to form a common interest,and the local government’s perception of this common interest is the subjective condition for the cooperation needs.Only when cooperation can bring stable income expectations and the benefits outweigh the costs,the local local government cooperation demand can be truly generated,which is the third condition for cooperation demand;a series of joint defenses from central to local since 2013 The joint control measures have achieved certain cooperation results,but in general,this cooperative governance shows the characteristics of passive,loose and intermittent under the pressure of the central government.The cooperative governance still faces three difficulties: one is the cooperation Difficulties are manifested in the fragmentation of the integration of cooperation concepts;the second is the difficulty in implementing policies,mainly characterized by the widespread existence of negative implementation;the third is the difficulty of executive supervision,that is,the fragmentation of supervision procedures.The root cause of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei air pollution cooperation dilemma lies in the complex conflicts of interest and conflicts behind it,including the contradiction between regional environmental interests and local economic interests,and the inconsistency between the local and international interest conflicts between Beijing and Tianjin and local governments.The key to the coordinated cooperation of air pollution in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei from "pressure-based cooperation" to independent cooperation is to establish a normalized and standardized horizontal interest coordination mechanism.The specific path includes the optimization of cooperative organizations,the improvement of cooperation rules and the improvement of cooperation mechanisms.