Research On The Integration Of Industry And Finance And Market Value Management Of Listed Companies In China

The main function and role of the capital market is to help and support enterprises with good business development level to obtain the necessary funds for entity business development,and to make full use of the capital market and reasonable channel to provide necessary support for the continuous development of enterprises.That is more and more important.At the same time,how to achieve the good integration of industry-finance capital(IIFC)through the integration mode of production and finance is of great importance.On the other hand,with the continuous improvement of governance structure,the role positioning of listed companies has been transforming into a platform that aims at creating value for all shareholders and doing value management,and thus the:internal value and market value are reasonably converged.Market value management has increasingly become a major problem for listed companies to solve.In fact,with the continuous development of the IIFC,market value management has become an important part of the IIFC—in the organic combination of the production behavior and the financial market,the stock price reflects the intrinsic value of the enterprise reasonably.And meanwhile,with good refinancing abilities,the listed-companies put more capitals on the business development,so the good interaction between industrial entity and financial capital is finally accomplished.The listed-companies would own production and business activities and financial market combination process,stock prices reflect the intrinsic value of the enterprise,at the same time,the company with good ability to refinance more money for business development,finally realize the good pattern of industrial and financial capital entities interact that can promote each other.At present,due to the particularity of China’s capital market,it is of great significance and practical value to take a correct view of the IIFC and market value management of Chinese listed companies.This article is based on the theories of corporate finance and corporate governance,and intends to study the related issues between the main aspects of the management of listed companies and the management of market capitalization in the context of listed companies market value.With deep development of the integration of industry-finance capital(IIFC),the motivation is to probe into the specific role of market value management in the development of listed companies.In that case,we can provide useful research suggestions and rationalization of reference views.For this purpose,this paper combines the main features,influencing mechanism and factors of the IIFC to explain the current main problems in details and analyze the the basic content,method and operation mode.At the same time,in order to further explain,by taking the micro-statistics data of listed companies listed in China’s A-share market and selecting different indicators as the objective criterions for measuring performance,the paper empirically analyzes the main factors influencing the performance of listed companies.On the other hand,according to the specific aspects of market value management of the listed companies,combined with the reality of the situation,this paper analyzes the main factors affecting the holding behaviors of the big shareholder within the scope of the market value management,and obtain the specific conclusions of the listed companies on the operating performance and the market value management.More specifically:On the one hand,by selecting data on China’s A-share listed companies between 2009 and 2016,this paper empirically analyzes the factors affecting the operation performances and discovers that ownerships structure,executive shares and salaries,assets liabilities ratio,human and physical capital are good explanations for the operation performances of he listed private firms.On the other hand,this paper studies the factors affecting shareholding increase of large shareholders and compares the outcomes of the general methods and the quantile regression,and discovers that stocks undervaluation,the type of enterprise and ownership structure are good explanations for big shareholders to increase.In view of the above research conclusions,the following suggestions are put forward.In view of the above conclusions,the following countermeasures are proposed:Firstly,we should give full play to the potential governance motivation of large shareholders,optimize the ownership structure and stock ownership,and improve the level of internal control.We should further establish and improve the long-term incentive mechanism for enterprises,and fully mobilize the enthusiasm of core employees and senior management.Finally,we should set reasonable salary gap and promotion channels to fully stimulate the working enthusiasm of the executives and employees,and maintain staff salary that can be risen with the improvement of the enterprises.Secondly,we should establish and improve the talent management mechanism,and drive the development of talent management with high efficiency,in order to improve the management level of material capital.By the continuous deepening of the"supply side reform",we should ensure the coordinated development of investment scale,growth and structure.At the same time,we should enhance the performance through moderate liabilities,and give full play to the positive role and demonstration effect of state-owned listed companies so as to form a more reasonable and perfect value investment pattern.Finally,by some reasonable innovations,we should explore and build a typical and standardized market value management mode that is more representative of China’s capital market.At the same time,we should further expand the disclosure scope and changes of related elements of the major shareholders’holdings plan,and fully assess their actual situations and potential market changes,follow-up implementation risks,corresponding countermeasures and implementation progress.Finally,we should give full play to the role of the external regulators’ supervision and management,follow the effective follow-up mechanism to track the main aspects of information disclosure,and explore the establishment of the list of negative behaviors.