| Energy is an indispensable resource for the economic development of all countries in the world.The increasing social demand poses a severe challenge to the rational development and utilization of coal,oil,electricity and other energy resources.Many countries have carried out energy industry reforms and strive to lead energy supply and demand through market mechanisms.For China,the competitive reform process of the two energy industries,coal and electricity,which are highly dependent,is not synchronized.The coal industry upstream of the coal-electricity industrial chain is basically fully market-oriented,and the downstream power industry is still under government regulation.As a result,the contradiction between coal and electricity supply and demand has become increasingly prominent.As a government that regulates the macro economy,it has gradually realized that the single industry reform in the upstream and downstream markets of the industrial chain in the reform will cause serious imbalances.Therefore,with the launch of the power market reform in 2002,the government began to implement the overall competitive reform of the coal-electr:icity industrial chain with coal price as the main entry point.In 2002,the guided price of coal for electricity was abolished,and administrative barriers between coal and electricity industries were broken,allowing conditional coal and electricity enterprises to enter each other.In 2005,the government promulgated the "Several Opinions on Promoting the Healthy Development of the Coal Industry",which formally proposed to encourage the development of coal-electricity integration.In 2012,the "Guiding Opinions on Deepening the Reform of Thermal Coal Marketization" clearly pointed out that the cancellation of key thermal coal contracts and the dual-track system of thermal coal prices,and encourage both coal and electricity to sign medium and long-term contracts.In 2016,the "Guiding Opinions on Developing Coal-Electric Joint Ventures" issued by the National Development and Reform Commission officially proposed to encourage the establishment of a long-term strategic cooperation mechanism for coal-fired power,and subsequently formulated detailed preferential measures.Although the process of competitive reform of China's coal-electricity industrial chain is deepening,the contradiction between coal and electricity has not been effectively resolved.Therefore,identifying the efficiency of China's coal-electricity industrial chain competitive reform under the new economic normal is the urgent need to deepen the competitive reform of the coal-electricity industrial chain and ease the tension between coal and power sources.This paper examines the efficiency of the competitive reform of China's coal-electricity industrial chain from both macro and micro perspectives,and empirically tests the current competition status of the coal-electricity industrial chain and the efficiency of the vertical integration policy of the coal and power.The efficiency of the implementation of the long-term strategic cooperation mechanism in the coal-electricity joint venture was analyzed by theory and game.The main contents of this paper are as follows:First,the evaluation of the macro-competitive situation of China's coal-electricity industrial chain.The most direct purpose of the competitive reform of China's coal-electricity industrial chain is to introduce market competition into the development of the industry chain.Based on the new empirical industrial organization theory,this paper takes relative market power as an index to evaluate the competitive situation of China's coal-electricity industrial chain,and evaluates the macro-efficiency of the competitive reform policy of the industry chain from the perspective of price transmission.Firstly,by sorting out the transmission mechanism of coal price and the causes of price distortion in China,the paper introduces policy factors into the transmission of coal price,and points out that the change of market structure caused by competitive reform policy in coal-electricity industrial chain is an important factor affecting coal price.Secondly,the paper calculates the market power of coal industry and electricity industry under the framework of NEIO.It was found that both the coal and electricity industries did not have their own market power,but the electricity market power was greater than that of the coal industry.It shows that the electricity industry has relative market power and is not conducive to the overall market competition of the industry chain.Finally,the distortion rate of electricity coal price is used to measure the degree of bias between electricity coal price and market coal price,and the co-integration equation of market structure and distortion rate of electricity coal price is constructed by ADF unit root test and Johansen co-integration test.The results show that the price distortion rate of coal is directly proportional to the market concentration of the power industry,and inversely proportional to the market concentration of the coal industry.With the increase of the concentration of the coal industry market,the correction effect on the price distortion of coal is more obvious.Second,the impact of the vertical integration policy of the coal-electricity industrial chain on the short-term production efficiency of micro-enterprises.Up to now,the main performance of the coal-electricity industrial chain competitive reform is to break the administrative barrier between the coal and power industry and promote the vertical integration of both enterprises.Firstly,this paper constructs a model to analyze the competitive and anti-competitive effects of vertical integration of coal-electricity industrial chain.It is concluded that the vertical integration of coal and electricity enterprises will bring about the efficiency effect that is conducive to competition,and will also bring about the market delineation effect that hinders competition.Secondly,the vertical integration index of coal and power industry is calculated by 1-0 method.It was found that the vertical integration index of both of them increased volatility,which initially showed that the implementation of the vertical integration policy of China's coal-electricity industrial chain was in good condition.Thirdly,the semi-parametric LP method is used to measure and analyze the TFP of the coal and the power industry.It is concluded that the TFP of coal and electricity industry shows a fluctuating upward trend in 2002-2017,and the rising trend of TFP of electricity industry is more significant.Finally,on the basis of the previous analysis,the multivariate quadratic regression model is constructed to empirically test the non-linear impact of the vertical integration policy of coal-electricity industrial chain on the production efficiency of coal and power enterprises.The results show that there is a non-linear "inverted U" relationship between the vertical integration policy of coal-electricity industrial chain and the TFP of enterprises,but there is no over-integration in this industrial chain at present.The vertical integration policy of the coal-electricity industrial chain will still promote the improvement of production efficiency in the short term.Third,the impact of strategic alliance policy on the long-term resource allocation efficiency of micro-enterprises.Since the vertical integration policy will hinder market competition in the long run,the deepening stage of China's coal-electricity industrial chain competitive reform should be supplemented by vertical integration policies,and vigorously promote the intermediate vertical relationship represented by strategic alliances.Firstly,based on the theory of network organization and resource dependence theory,this paper makes a theoretical analysis of the resource allocation efficiency of coal-fired strategic alliances,and concludes that due to the "competition+ cooperation" relationship between coal and electricity companies,the coal-power strategic alliance policy can avoid the uncertainty in the transaction through the effective allocation of resources to achieve long-term maximum value creation.Secondly,constructing a revenue model to analyze the efficiency of the vertical relationship between coal and electricity enterprises in selecting strategic alliances from the perspective of cost and benefit trade-offs.It is found that coal and electricity strategic alliance can increase the benefits of coal and electricity enterprises through cost reduction and value creation compared with market transactions.Thirdly,through the non-cooperative game model of market transaction and the cooperative game model of strategic alliance transaction,the incentive degree of the two models to the specific investment of coal and power enterprises is analyzed.The simulation results show that the special investment incentives under the non-cooperative game of market transactions are insufficient,and the coal-fired strategic alliance policy can more effectively promote the allocation of coal-fired resources and prevent under-investment and waste.Finally,a behavioral game model is established to examine the impact of long-term contracts with penalty clauses on the behavioral decision-making of coal and power enterprises.It is found that such contracts can well avoid the risks brought by uncertainties in market demand and effectively alleviate the tension of coal and power in China. |
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