| The fierce competition among modern firms and the rapid development of information technology require firms to accelerate the response speed to the demand changes of users,making supply chain alliance,as a transformation for firms,a focus in supply chain operation.The cooperation among firms in the field of supply chain is reflected in all the links,such as joint purchasing,inventory cooperation,joint promotion,joint transportation and R&D cooperation.However,firms in alliance,as profit individuals,are engaged the alliance for the fundamental purpose of gaining economic revenue.Therefore,for the whole supply chain alliance,how to assess the member company’s contribution to the alliance and the profit distribution based on the contribution is of great significance.Whether the profit distribution scheme is reasonable also determines the success and failure of the cooperation and the sustainability.Alliance operation strategy and the alliance stability have already become an unavoidable issue and the focus of the research.This paper is targeted at the practical issues existing in distribution supply chain,assembly supply chain and research and development of enterprises regarding alliance cooperation.The paper applies myopic stability and farsighted stability in cooperative game theory,so as to explore related alliance operation strategies,and alliance stability and analyse the reasons for the failure of alliance cooperation,aiming to offer practical guidance and theoretical support for the virtuous circle of supply chain alliance.The main work of the dissertation are summarized as follows:(1)Cooperation strategy and coalition’s stability in distribution supply chain.First,we consider a two-echelon distribution supply chain system comprising one supplier and three retailers.We analyze alliance/coalition formation between retailers using a two-stage approach and coalition stability using the concept of myopic stability and farsighted stability in cooperative game theory.In Stage 1,retailers form coalitions that each agree to order the same quantity product.In Stage 2,we consider three modes of competition between supplier and retailers.The results show that,whoever the leader is,the grand coalition is not a stable structure for myopic retailers in Stackelberg model,but the grand coalition is the stable structure for the farsighted retailers.Furthermore,other possible stable coalition structures under different competition intensity were also presented with a farsighted view.Then,we consider cooperation strategy and coalition’s stability with one supplier and two retailers in distribution supply chain.The alliance’s pricing strategy and stability are studied under different competitive intensities.Firstly,we analyzes the different alliance pricing strategies based on Stackelberg games;then it allocates the alliance profits based on Shapley value and considers the myopic stability of the grand coalition;finally,it discusses the farsighted stability of all the coalition structures.The result shows that the grand coalition is myopically stable only when the competitive intensity is relatively weak,and that the supplier-retailer alliance is more likely to happen in the long run.(2)Cooperation strategy and coalition’s stability in assembly supply chain.We first consider an assembly system with n upstream suppliers and a downstream assembler,where the upstream suppliers sell n complementary components to a downstream assembler,then the downstream assembler sell products to the market.Each supplier and assembler have the freedom to decide whether to cooperate with each other.The results show that the profit of the assembly system is highest in the grand coalition structure.To allocate the system-wide profit between upstream suppliers and downstream assembler,we construct a cooperative game with supermodular,and then compute the transfer prices for the assembly system.Then,we consider the cooperation strategy when the assembly supply chain system is faced with a competitive enterprise producing homogeneous products.The results show that when the downstream assembler faces the competition,the grand coalition is stable under different competitive intensity,and based on the stability of the alliance,the reasonable distribution strategy of the alliance profit is given.(3)Cooperation strategy and coalition’s stability in R&D alliance.First,we consider the strategy of R&D cooperation of the firms that produce homogenous products in order to reduce R&D expenditure and improve the competitiveness.We use a three-stage approach to study the coalition R&D cartelization and the coalition R&D RJV,in stage 1,agents form alliance,and in stage 2,coalitions make decisions about R&D level,finally,the firms set their quantities in the production stage.The results show that the stability of the R&D alliance is related to the R&D cost coefficient and the information spillovers.Then we discuss the cooperation strategy and the coalition stability of under the RJV cartel model,with competition and cooperation in the production stage.The results show that,if the production stage is allowed to cooperate,in most cases,the firm which didn’t cooperate with each other will get more profit and is farsighted stable. |
