Research On The Reputation Value Of Equity Incentives Implemented By Chinese Listed Companies

We find that the liseted ompany equity incentive to transfer a positive signal to alleviate the agency problem,can bring reputation to the listed company,and this reputation can obtain the external authentication of the capital,and listed company's self-restraint,which can provide additional reputation value for listed companies equity incentive policy.At present,there are few literatures in this field,and our research results of this paper are necessary for this field.This article makes empirical tests through three dimensions: reputation realization effect,reputation certification effect,reputation restriction effect.Then the paper establish and improve the the reputation value theory of the listed company's equity incentive policy.This can provide additional value information for the listed company's equity incentive policy.With the gradual establishment of the enterprise system,the separation of the ownership and the management right of the company,result in the conflict between the manager and the investor.Jensen & Mecking(1976)showed that the agency problem will lead to agency costs.As an important proposition in corporate governance,equity incentive as a mitigation program has been widely used.At present,foreign scholars on the study of equity incentive and information disclosure more inclined to information-manipulated field,although it did not draw a consistent conclusion(Luo Fubi,Ran maosheng,Du Jiating 2008]).In their review,foreign scholars on the negative effects of equity incentive is more concerned,especially in the United States the development of the capital market is relatively mature the countries have appeared operators in order to sell the stock profit and false disclosure event.At the same time,they think that there are few studies on the effect of equity incentive in china.While the domestic scholars on the review of equity incentive in our country and the future development direction is also reviewed,such as Ding Baoli,Wang Shenghai,Liu Xiyou,(2012)who reviews the historical development of the equity incentive in China,analyzes the theoretical and empirical research on the existing problems,and puts forward some suggestions related to the institutional innovation and promoting equity incentive for the supervision department.The enforcement agencies shall strictly audit and inspect information disclosure of the listed company,establish the integrity of the files listed company managers.They believe that the mandatory information disclosure system should be used as the main means to regulate the capital market.But,in recent years the research on equity incentive mechanism of reputation literature is still small,the author tried to search Chinese Knowledge-Online to find some literature before 2009,Huang Qunhui,Li Chunqi(2001)have been related.Their perspective is diversified compensation from the managers of state-owned enterprises,they propose that the reputation mechanism have important influence to operators,the stock income constitute the major variables which makes the western executive compensation and corporate performance to be strongly correlated.They recognize the income of stock option and reputation mechanism of has an important role in the establishment of strong correlation between the executive compensation and the corporate performance.They consider that reputation mechanism,improve the authenticity of accounting information,and the stock option can be long-term compensation.In the light of the economic environment and business situation,they did not discuss relationship of equity incentive and reputation mechanism(or endogeneity problem),and only focus on the long-term effect of the reputation mechanism of the operators,did not see the short-term impact on the occupation managers,but also did not examine the stock option of listed companies the reputation effect,which will become the important significance of the problem.This article will also discuss the effect of the reputation mechanism of equity incentive to obtain capital premium,for the company to get more resources supervision.Especially for state-owned enterprise reform,mixed ownership pilot,equity incentive pilot reform today,more practical significance.In addition,a large number of domestic and foreign scholars in the study of equity incentive decisions,more focused on the welfare motivation and motivation to discuss the analysis,the formation of a two yuan comparison of curing thinking.This paper from a new perspective of reputation mechanism,discusses the multiple effects of equity incentive,find new profit and risk for equity incentive decision-making,decision-making efficiency and help to improve the equity incentive of listed companies,the implementation of the net present value of negative equity incentive is possible.This paper makes an empirical test through three dimensions: reputation effect,reputation constraint effect and reputation incentive effect.It establishes and perfects the theory of equity incentive reputation value,and provides the incremental value information.The reputation value of equity incentive includes reputation effect,reputation incentive effect and reputation constraint effect.Among them,the implementation of equity incentive implementation of equity incentive effect of reputation to create additional reputation of listed companies,attracted more attention,such as capital market intermediary information analyst,the fifth chapter in this paper through empirical results verification;equity incentive incentive effect of reputation for the implementation of equity incentive of listed companies will bring the reputation incentive show the higher value,so as to get more support,such as in the capital market to the prudent for the fund investors,the sixth chapter in this paper through the empirical results verify the stock ownership incentive;reputation constraint effect for the implementation of equity incentive of listed companies will bring the reputation constraints more standardized operation,reduce non-compliance the behavior and the punishment,punishment and penalty such as open market regulators,which through the seventh chapter of this paper.Verification of results.The acquisition and exchange of information is the premise of self realization of reputation mechanism.The issuing process and the internal mechanism of the stock ownership incentive have the function of producing,obtaining and exchanging information,which triggers the reputation mechanism and affects the cost curve or utility function.Then,through the three dimensions of equity incentive reputation value theory,we make the the empirical analysis.First of all,realize the effect of dimension inspection equityincentive reputation,the fourth chapter of this paper presents the H1 hypothesis: equity incentive can significantly attract analyst attention;H2: equity incentive can significantly attract more attention of analysts.Through the empirical test of the hypothesis H1,the results show that the equity incentive can attract the attention of the securities analysts,the formal implementation of the equity incentive to create a reputation effect,support the hypothesis H1.This is because in the capital market,securities analysts love more focus on corporate governance level,more transparent information disclosure,the high reputation of the company,and the implementation of equity incentive to the capital market to convey the high level of corporate governance,information disclosure of incremental information transparent,the incremental information is captured as the capital market is one of the key information intermediary securities analysts,revealed the information value increment.At the same time,as one of the important information intermediaries in the capital market,securities analysts are also concerned about the listed companies to bring a certain reputation.Therefore,the implementation of equity incentive brings incremental information,with incremental value,so as to win the reputation of listed companies.Through the empirical test on the hypothesis of H2,the results show that the equity incentive is very significant to attract more attention of analysts,the implementation of equity incentive companies significantly increased analyst attention supports the hypothesis of H2.This is because on the one hand,in the capital market,securities analysts as the key participants,play an important role in the information intermediary,securities analysts are also facing fierce competition,the high level of corporate governance,information disclosure and transparency,the company has high reputation preference.And the higher the level of corporate governance,the more transparent information disclosure,the higher the reputation of the company,the more likely to get more attention of securities analysts.On the other hand,the announcement of the implementation of equity incentive to the investors also convey a high level of corporate governance,information disclosure and transparent incremental information and incremental reputation,the increment and the incremental reputation to cater to the common preference of securities analysts,the more the number of securities analysts pay attention,also pass the signal of incremental reputation and incremental value more,further show the listed company equity incentive incremental information value and increment of reputation.Secondly,the incentive effects of equity incentive reputation dimension for the inspection,the fifth chapter proposes the hypothesis of H3 equity incentive can attract significant investment holdings reputation mechanism;stock investment can significantly attract high reputation mechanism more equity incentive H4.Through the empirical test of the hypothesis H3,the results show that the equity incentive can attract the investment of social security institutions,and support the hypothesis that H3.This is because the social security fund as the capital market reputation is an important basis of investors,participants and investors in the capital market,with the social evaluation of higher value,the characteristics of major responsibility,widespread social impact,the certification effect on investment holdings of listed companies has.Equity incentive for listed companies to increase the reputation and information,equity incentive to obtain the social security fund,which is a high reputation of institutional investors holding behavior,showing the reputation effect of equity incentive.Through the empirical test of the hypothesis H4,the results show that the equity incentive can attract the investment of the social security institutions more significantly,which supports the hypothesis that H4.This is because the social security fund as the capital market on the reputation of investors,the value of the value of the main responsibility,the higher the stake,the stronger the certification effect.So it can attract a higher proportion of social security,which means that the equity incentive of listed companies can bring higher incremental reputation and greater value of incremental information.Finally,in order to test the effect of equity incentive reputation constraint,the sixth chapter puts forward the hypothesis that H5 equity incentive can significantly reduce the possibility of being punished by the law enforcement agencies.H6 equity incentive can significantly reduce the amount of punishment for regulators.Through the empirical test on the hypothesis of H5,the results show that the equity incentive can significantly reduce the possibility by regulators and law enforcement of punishment,to curb the negative reputation,reflects the reputation effect of equity incentive of listed companies to implement.This paper supports the hypothesis that H5.This is because the equity incentive can significantly reduce the possibility of regulatory penalties,to curb the possibility of huge loss of reputation,showing a huge reputation gains bring equity incentive,provides strong evidence for the equity incentive effect of reputation.Palmrose al ET(2004),Firth et al,Karpoff et al.(2008)study also shows that the company will be a false statement of serious wealth losses to shareholders,most of the loss of reputation.Through the empirical test on the hypothesis of H6,the results show that the equity incentive regulatory agencies can significantly reduce the amount of punishment,the formation of equity incentive reputation gains,reflecting the reputation effect of equity incentive of listed companies to implement.This paper supports the hypothesis that H6.This is because in the control of the quality of information disclosure,the total scale,profitability,quality of information,holding ratio,equity incentive regulation can significantly reduce the amount of punishment,embodies the equity incentive reputation gains directly,providing direct evidence for the equity incentive effect of reputation.Equity incentive has important reputation value,for listed companies,especially in the mixed ownership reform of state-owned listed companies is of great significance,so the author puts forward several suggestions: one is that the listed companies,especially state-owned enterprises,in the mixed ownership reform ESOP,more attention should be paid to equity incentive the realization of reputation effect,improve the information disclosure environment,ease financing constraints,improve capital increment,improve the capital position,expand business scale,improve the corporate governance mechanism,to promote business growth,improve the production ability;two listed companies should pay full attention to the equity incentive effect of reputation incentive,equity incentive in the decision-making process,fully consider the equity incentive the reputation of income,so that some negative NPV of equity incentive can be effectively avoided,only considering the net present value But adversely affected by aircraft,miss a good opportunity to expand shareholder wealth;three listed companies should pay full attention to the equity incentive restraint effect,because the equity incentive restraint effect,curb various non-standard business possibilities,reducing the amount of risk and regulatory penalties suffered punishment.This has important significance to promote the standardization and legitimacy of listed companies,and has an important role in promoting the external reputation of listed companies.