Study On Power Restriction Of State-owned Assets Of Enterprises Supervision

Since establishment of PRC, the state has taken a series of reform measures on the supervision over state-owned assets of enterprises, which lasted nearly 60 years and spanned two historical stages of planned economy system period and initial period of economic system transformation. Currently, it enters into the crucial period of economic system transformation. In academic circles and industrial circles, “reform enters into deep water” is often used to show the arduous tasks the reform is facing, the complexity of problems to solve and the greatness of risks to assume.For a long time, gradual reform strategies of taking stopgap measures rather than radical measures on state-owned assets supervision of enterprises were adopted in the state, and the state failed to take a comprehensive consideration and promote the reform radically from the level of constitutional construction, which takes the restriction of power as the core. The lagging of constitutional construction taking restriction of power as the core, resulted in a situation where the advantage group developed in years of reform process controlled and abducted validity of state-owned assets of enterprises supervision reform in the name of so called “state or public interest”, while on the other side people as the ultimate owners were in an awkward situation where channels of supervision over state-owned assets were blocked and just interests appeal could not be well expression. Nowadays, among various problems that obsess the national reform, state-owned assets of enterprises supervision reform has fundamental and global significance to overall situation. The complexity and multidimensionality of the problems involved in this reform and the universality and profoundness of its influence determine it is no more a pure economic development problem but a significant constitutional problem concerning democratic politics construction and society harmony and stability. The key to solve the problem is to stand at level of constitutional construction and economic system transformation to reconstruct power restriction rules and mechanism in state-owned assets of enterprises supervision to ensure the overall function optimization and benefit maximization of the state-owned assets of enterprise in our political, economic society.The text of this thesis is totally divided into five chapters, whose main contents are as follows:Chapter one, through general introduction of historical development and current status of state-owned assets of enterprises supervision, it establishes theoretical foundation for research on restriction of power in state-owned assets of enterprises supervision and provides historical and realistic basis for future reform framework design. In planned economy system period, state-owned assets of enterprises supervision system of China was unified with the administrative system with highly centralized power. During revolution period and initial stage after establishment of PRC, under influence of political authority, moral belief, leaders and models, probity self-discipline, stringent law and punishment rather than traditional power restriction rules and mechanism, the supervision and operation of state-owned assets of enterprises appeared administrative and low efficient, but generally speaking, the scale of state-owned assets of enterprises was continually expanding under the precondition of realizing public interests, and the phenomenon of great assets loss didn't occur. During initial period of economic system transformation, due to collapse of above mentioned traditional power-restricting rules and mechanism and lagging of constitutional construction that taking restriction of power as the core, China's state-owned assets of enterprises were operated through commercial operation in the name of marketization and public interests under intervene of advantage administrative power(The typical manifestation was that supervision power over state-owned assets of enterprises was centralized in government and state-owned enterprises and other non-state-owned enterprises are also applicable to Company Law), which resulted in great loss of state-owned assets of enterprises, appearance of political economy alliance and bureaucracy economy, social wealth controlled by minority and damage of people's economic democratic rights. Entering into the crucial period of economic system transformation, in spite of continuous improvement of China's construction of democracy and law and continuous perfection of state-owned assets of enterprises supervision rules, the existence of the advantage group of political economy alliance makes China's overall social reform including state-owned assets of enterprises supervision and operation reform very difficult, for they are pulled back by benefit-gained stratum. It also severely blocks China's construction of democracy and law, economic system transformation and settlement of problems on people's livelihood.Chapter two, through introduction and analysis on current status of state-owned assets of enterprises supervision in western developed capital countries, it provides experience reference for reconstruction of power restriction rules and mechanism in China's state-owned assets of enterprises supervision. Taking a comprehensive view of state-owned assets of enterprises supervision by western developed capital countries, the distinguish characteristics can be summarized as: to achieve effective supervision, scientifically defining the nature of ownership of state-owned assets of enterprises is the precondition, perfect power restriction mechanism is the guarantee, and complete ruling system is the foundation. These are also the aspects imperfect in China's state-owned assets of enterprises supervision, in other word aspects to improve.Chapter three, through in-depth analysis of existing problems in China's state-owned assets of enterprises supervision, it summarizes various damage brought to citizen's property rights in state-owned assets of enterprises supervision and operation, and demonstrates unfavorable influences on long-term harmonious and healthy development of society, politics and economy, and further stresses the necessity of establishing power restriction rules and mechanism in state-owned assets of enterprises supervision. The effective protection of property rights is the rights basis of constitutional construction and successful economic system transformation, and is also the basic way of the survival and development of every citizen and the fundamental content of economic human rights. Self-damage on state-owned assets of enterprises and slacking down material foundation of constitutional construction and economic system transformation by utilizing state-owned assets of enterprises to damage citizen's property poses a threat in a great degree to China's harmonious and healthy development of society, politics and economy. Therefore, the existing problems and unfavorable influences shall be clearly understood, and relative rules and mechanism shall be reformed accordingly.Chapter four, through brief introduction, comment and analysis of power restriction theory and public choice theory, it provides theoretical support and direction guidance for reconstruction of power restriction rules and mechanism in state-owned assets of enterprises supervision. The characteristics and necessity disclosed by power restriction theory provides dimensions of politics, economy and society for power restriction perfection in state-owned assets of enterprises supervision. Public choice theory provides strong theoretic basis and explanation to various problems existing in state-owned assets of enterprises supervision, explains and provides market and rule dimensions for perfection of power restriction in state-owned assets of enterprises supervision. In general, above mentioned theories(in particular, the formation of economic model of power of restriction, namely “economy restriction over power”) provide theoretical foundation and methodical guidance for reconstruction of power restriction rules and mechanism in state-owned assets of enterprises supervision. To realize effective restriction of government power, excessive control and occupation of social economy resources by government and its market agent- state-owned enterprises should be restricted. Through strategic adjustment of structure and distribution of state-owned economy to establish a situation where the state and society could share the economy resources in a moderate way; the essence is to shrink the areas that state-owned assets of enterprises exist, especially common competitive area, and enlarge areas that non-state-owned assets exist to build a reasonable domestic economic structure form.Chapter five, taking a reference to power restriction theory, public choice theory and mature experience of western developed capital countries, and from the level of constitutional construction and economic system transformation, it brings forward countermeasures and measures towards reconstruction of power restriction rules and mechanism in China's future state-owned assets of enterprises supervision. Firstly, in terms of supervision by the National People's Congress, ownership of state-owned assets of enterprises and creditor right belong to the National People's Congress, and its auditing right over state-owned assets of enterprises, determination right on adjustment of state-owned economy distribution and structure adjustment, together with the legislation right over major issues shall be endowed to the National People's Congress through legislation; Secondly, in government supervision aspect, separate the supervision, management and creditor right currently conducted by State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, and change government-oriented audit system into legislation-oriented audit system; Thirdly, in legal supervision aspect, reform the legal system to ensure independence of legal system and establish public appeal system in state-owned assets of enterprises supervision; Fourthly, in central and local supervision of state-owned assets of enterprises, establish reasonable interests distribution pattern between central government and local government through scientific partition of state-owned assets attribution and right allocation; Fifthly, in society supervision aspect, incorporate the People' s Political and Consultative Conference into the construction of state-owned assets of enterprises supervision system, and strengthen state-owned assets of enterprises supervision by society through establishing protection association of state-owned assets of enterprises.In conclusion, from the level of constitutional construction and economic system transformation, and from the multi-science integration angle of politics, economy, law and society, combining theory with practice, the thesis abstracts a basic thinking train and strategic frame for power restriction rules and mechanism reconstruction in state-owned assets of enterprises supervision. In this way, arrangement of rules and mechanism of China's state-owned assets of enterprises supervision and operation will be established and adjusted according to majority's interests to realize the concrete return of people's ultimate economic sovereignty over state-owned assets of enterprises so as to make pygmy efforts to provide solid rules and mechanism foundation for China's long-term harmonious and healthy development of society, politics and economy.