Supply Chain Performance Optimization With Behavior Factors

Rapid development of e-commerce,especially the online to offline(O2O)sale,brings out a win-win situation among consumers,businesses and service providers.Some challenges exist to implement O2 O,which result from the influence of decision-makers to enterprises' operation in the traditional organization.Therefore,it is necessary to study the optimization of supply chain performance by considering the different behavior of decision-makers.Considering members' self-interest,risk aversion and overconfidence of traditional supply chain,this paper uses game theory,downside-risk theory and overconfidence theory,to study how to improve the supply chain performance from internal operation to external channel structure.In terms of internal operation,the self-interest and risk-aversion of the members are considered to study the coordination of the three-echelon supply chain which is common in practice.Two kinds of revenue sharing contracts in the multi-echelon supply chain are compared to improve the supply chain performance.In terms of external channel structure,based on the homogeneous and the heterogeneous of consumer,this paper considers overconfidence and aims to analyze the impact of the buy online and pick up in store(BOPS)model on the supply chain performance.First,in a three-echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer,a distributor and a retailer,game theory is used to study the situation that the members present decentralized decision-making because of self-interested.In static game,coordination of the three-echelon supply chain could be achieved by both of the two revenue sharing contracts while in dynamic game,they do nothing but improving the performance of the whole supply chain.Second,if the retailer is risk-aversion,the theory of downside-risk is used.For being not able to coordinate the aforementioned supply chain by the two revenue-sharing contracts,a risk-sharing contract is designed.For the whole supply chain's profit and the single members' profit,the two contracts are different due to each member's profit share and retailers' downside-risk aversion level.If the risk-sharing contract is implemented,the efficiency of the two contracts has the same affection on the retailer and the whole supply chain,but the distributor and the manufacturer will hold opposite preference towards the two contractsThirdly,the performance of the omnichannel with homogeneous customer is affected by retailers' overconfidence and BOPS.If customers doing procurement offline,BOPS will increase the retailer's optimal order quantity and the increment present a diminishing relationship with retailer's overconfidence.In addition,BOPS is able to reduce the order deviation resulted from the retailer's overconfidence.If customers' offline purchasment only when BOPS is valid,BOPS increase the expected profit of omnichannel.If customers are loyal to offline and independent with BOPS,the same result could be achieved only when the margin profit of online sales and the retailer's overconfidence reach a necessary level.Fourth,the performance of the omnichannel with heterogeneous customer is affected by retailers' overconfidence and BOPS.Whether BOPS is implemented,overconfident retailer's optimal order quantity is closer to the average level than the retailer without cognition bias,so the expected profit of the ominichannel is decreased.If there is no BOPS,proportion of each category of customer in the market is related to the retailer's overconfidence level.But if BOPS is implemented,the proportion of buy-online customers will be reduced and the variation of buy-offline customers will be related to retailer's overconfidence level when customers choose the minimal trouble cost,however BOPS will increase retailer's optimal order quantity and the proportion of buy-offline customers when they not.Finally,the above research results are applied to Belle Shoes,by analyzing the internal operation and exterior channel dilemma of Belle supply chain,to give some optimization strategies to improve the supply chain performance.