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Supply Chain Carbon Emission Reduction Based Behavior Of Enterprise Operation Decision Under Exogenous-Force Intervention

Posted on:2014-11-01Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y D LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:1269330422968100Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In low carbon economy, the enterprise makes profit and bears the environmentalcosts of carbon emissions simultaneously.Economic activities should reflect scarceand efficient allocation of environmental resources and carbon emission allowancehas become a kind of resource.The research themes includes:carbon emission costdistribution and scientific measurement in supply chain, supply chain performanceand structure optimization under low carbon environment, supply chain operationintegrated optimization, coordination of member enterprises,operation behavior,decision-making mechanism and cooperation mechanism design of supply chainenterprises under low carbon environment. In this paper, we pay attention to supplychain carbon emission reduction, mainly focusing on the following items:1.Based on the effect of consumer awareness of low carbon supply chain,theunification of low carbon supply chain from three aspects:production,resource andcarbon emission allowance are dicussed.We compare performance of the differentdecision in supply chain on the carbon emission.Finally, we use mode to analyze themembers profit and the whole supply chain profit.2. The related problems between emissions supervision of the government andlow carbon production decision of the core enterprise in supply chain are studied fromthe perspective of evolutionary game theory. We use double groups’ evolutionarygame theory to demonstrate the equilibrium of the relationship between thegovernment and the core enterprise.Finally, the effects of different parameters on theevolutionary equilibrium results are compared and analyzed.3.We construct the carbon trading right pricing game model from the carbonemissions of the scarce resources.Discuss the profits based on two pricing powerstructrue of two Exogenous-Force Interventions. On the basis of this,analysis thegame relationship and both sides of their sharing.4.In the different dominated supply chain,we analyze emission reduction R&Dcooperation in supply chain based on government subsidies and low carbonpreference of consumers.The article mainly discusses two points:one point is toanalyze Subsidy policy of government which helps to provide a certain proportion of low carbon R&D cost allocation.The other point is to analyze the influence ongovernment revenue and profits of the supply chain.5. We further discuss two level supply chain composed of manufacturer-supplier,and research on the government to levy a tax on carbon.We analysis the situationwhich the supplier shares with manufacturers on research and development costs. Thispaper we take the suppliers’ view, find at which conditions the supplier join theemission-reducing R&D investment of manufacture can realize its profit maximum.
Keywords/Search Tags:Low Carbon Supply Chain, Low-Carbon Preference, Cost Allocation, Government Subsidies, Emission-Reducing R&D, Emission-Reducing Cooperation, Game Theory
PDF Full Text Request
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